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The Nation.

June 23, 1979 $1

EDITORIAL

# A WORD OF WELCOME

With this issue we welcome 5,100 new subscribers from *The Civil Liberties Review*, which, sadly, has gone the way of such other worthy independent voices as *More*, *Politicks* and *New Times*.

It is ironic that *The Nation*, which has long been on record against the trend toward merger and increasing concentration in media, should be the beneficiary of *C.L.R.*'s untimely demise. But we take pride in the finding by Alan Westin, its editor, that "Of all the magazines that were interested in obtaining our subscriber list, I felt *The Nation* would come closest to providing the breadth and direction of civil liberties writing that *C.L.R.* offered."

It is typical, rather than calculated, that in this issue of *The Nation* our commitment to First Amendment values is underlined by Aryeh Neier's point-by-point examination of the criticisms raised by opponents of Joan Baez's open letter on alleged human rights violations in Vietnam, and J. Anthony Lukas's bittersweet review of Charles Morgan's memoirs.

In the months ahead, our scheduled articles include Frank Donner on assassination conspiratologists, Leslie Dunbar on his battle to wrest his files from the C.I.A., Sylvia Kronstadt on sexism in the work place, Carey McWilliams on the history of tensions between the radicals and the liberals.

We intend to deserve the confidence *C.L.R.* readers have shown in electing to join *The Nation* community rather than depleting it by taking us up on our money-back offer. *The Civil Liberties Review* is dead; long live the values it held. We resolve to keep them alive and hope that those who share them will be with us as subscription-renewers, as authors, as letters-to-the-editor writers, as sources of ideas and, above all, as committed readers.

THE BAEZ LETTER
Aryeh Neier

EUROLEFT SCHISM
Daniel Singer

ITALIAN ELECTION
Charles Mann

INFLATION & PROGRESSIVES
Bertram Gross

SAVING SOMOZA
Cynthia Arnson

CHARLES MORGAN & THE A.C.L.U.
J. Anthony Lukas

SUPERPOWERS' LAST STAND

# SALT AND THE U.S.–SOVIET ALLIANCE

ALAN WOLFE

The most important thing to keep in mind when the Senate debates the strategic-arms limitation treaty is that the discussion will have little to do with reality. There will be goodly amounts of partisanship, opportunism, demagogy, chauvinism, chicanery, hypocrisy, lying and scapegoating, but it is already clear from the preliminary discussion that in this debate the real world is not to be a factor. Neither the opposition to SALT II nor the tactics chosen by President Carter to win its approval can be understood unless one enters into and tries to comprehend the fantasies that dominate both Washington and Moscow.

The reality is that SALT II is a conservative attempt by two declining superpowers to maintain their hold on a world that is slipping out of their control. The Russians understand this better than Washington, which explains their greater desire to have the treaty ratified. But neither side has fully comprehended the reality that whatever they do may be undermined by the radical realignments already taking place throughout the world.

Since the end of World War II, American foreign policy has had as its overriding goal the preservation of a conservative world order that would insure the prosperity of its economic system. It was not long before American policy makers began to realize that the Russians could be of considerable help in achieving this goal. Although ideological opposition to Communism became the official line, an unofficial

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# LETTERS.

## CAMELOT REVISITED

*Flossmoor, Ill.*

Prof. Herbert Gans's thoughtful piece ["Deception and Disclosure in the Field," *The Nation*, May 5] is, unfortunately, marred by some serious misconceptions about the most famous, or infamous, social research project of the 1960s.

Project Camelot—a study of revolution calling for field work in Latin America—was financed by the Department of the Army, not the Department of State. State was (and remains) notoriously skeptical about such grandiose enterprises and too poor, in any case, to indulge even its mild passions for social research.

But there's a far more important point. It was *not* the social scientists on Camelot who "closed down the study" after realizing that they might be "used as spies." Quite the contrary; most project members seemed perfectly happy to be "used" (although spying was hardly what the Army had in mind) so long as the Pentagon provided hitherto undreamed-of treasures for what some of them modestly dubbed the "Manhattan Project" of the social sciences.

Until the study was canceled, criticism of it came almost exclusively from the State Department, which argued that it was intellectually shoddy and politically insensitive. The latter judgment, at least, was amply confirmed by the unprecedented public debate initiated by attacks on the project in Latin America. Once things had reached that point, the Army sensibly enough canceled Camelot, much to the distress of the project staff and its academic claque.

Professor Gans's errors are curious, in view of the publicity that Camelot received. He attributes to academic social scientists a kind of foresight and virtue that they conspicuously lacked in that case—and, I must add, in numerous other Government-sponsored studies of foreign affairs that have never received such public attention.

*Pio D. Uliassi, Foreign Service Reserve Officer, Retired*

*New York City*

Fourteen years have passed since the rise and fall of Project Camelot, which may account for my faulty memory about its sponsor and social scientists. Nevertheless, Mr. Uliassi, a State Department official who served on the Camelot Core Planning Group, has also forgotten some details. For example, the sociologist Johan Galtung, who was asked to participate in the study, exposed it instead, thus helping to initiate Latin American opposition to it. Also, State, hardly a paragon of intellectual rigor and political sensitivity in 1965, criticized the project partly to discourage Pentagon intervention in its foreign affairs.

*Herbert J. Gans*

## APOLITICAL ART

*New York City*

The wave of criticism, including "Oscar for Our Sins" by Gloria Emerson [*The Nation*, May 12], rolling over *The Deer Hunter* has me puzzled. Unaware of the "racist, guilt-salvaging" charges directed at it before I saw the film, I admittedly viewed it without benefit of personal experience (military or journalistic) in Vietnam; on the other hand, I didn't confront it conscious of the political head-swiveling insisted upon by its vocal detractors, either. I simply saw it.

I *think* I saw the same movie Ms. Emerson and others did. Inexplicably (to me, anyway), I found it to be a savage condemnation of our presence in Vietnam, not an apology for nor a justification of it. . . . Did we really need to be told who sent them there? Did we need Johnson, Nixon, Rusk, Kissinger, Westmoreland or Calley on that bloody screen as well? Had we not already seen Michael (DeNiro) to be a lonely, hardened, walled-in, sexually frustrated, mystically bloodthirsty man who could survive only and precisely by his limitations? And did we not watch Nick (Walken), from the moment he first fired at his own temple and missed, succumb to playing with death as another G.I. might succumb to heroin? Would the critics be satisfied with the "realism" if we'd had repeated scenes of mind-blown soldiers shooting dope instead of bullets, as so many of them did?

I read recently on the Op-Ed page of *The New York Times* that *The Deer Hunter* "insults the memory of every American who died in Vietnam." My reaction was: by extension, *Catch-22* stains the honor of every American who died in World War II. In my opinion, neither is remotely true. Heller's vision of war, made more digestible perhaps by its delectably dark humor, soars as Cimino's does: artistically, not literally.

I also read the words of one Boston film critic who'd picketed *The Deer Hunter* for being so racist; confronting a viewer who likened it to Tolstoy or Dostoevsky ("bad politics, maybe, but good art"), he cunningly wrote, "Luckily, I've never read Tolstoy." Luckily, I wondered, for *whom*? *Joseph P. Kahn*

*Richmond*

Gloria Emerson's review of *The Deer Hunter* reeks of the same moral self-righteousness and inflexibility of mind that got us into Vietnam in the first place. Like Sam Peckinpah a few years back I think Cimino is entitled to his fantasies and a little poetic license. The men of the Seventh Cavalry aren't going to win any kudos in my book but I can still enjoy the picture of *Custer's Last Stand* over the mirror at the neighborhood bar, something I hope the Emersons of this world won't be able to stop us from doing. *Gary Oneal*

*Trenton, N.J.*

Gloria Emerson's fine article not only convinced me not to rush out and see *The Deer Hunter* but also made me aware of an important document on the Vietnam War—*The Winter Soldier Investigation.*

I work in a college library and immediately checked to see if the book was in the collection. Happily, it was, but no one had ever taken the book out and it looked untouched. This is a bit distressing at a school with more than 5,000 students and more than 200 faculty, many of whom have probably seen *The Deer Hunter*.

Another excellent work of a similar nature that I recommend is *Standard Operating Procedure*, by James Simon Kunen. In this book, the author of *The Strawberry Statement* serves primarily as a compiler of testimony from Vietnam veterans. Unfortunately, this work is out of print, but most public and academic libraries should have a copy available. I found a copy in my library, and was pleased to see that it had circulated a few times in the past five or six years. *Thomas A. Karel*

*The Nation* welcomes letters from readers but space limitations often prevent publication of those of more than 250 words. Name will be withheld upon request.

### *THE NATION*'S PAPER

Due to a temporary shortage in our supply of jet newsprint, this issue of *The Nation* is printed on regular newsprint. Next week, if possible, we will return to our normal paper.

*—The Editors*

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# EDITORIALS.

## The Baez Letter

The recent advertisement placed by Joan Baez and a number of supporters condemning violations of human rights in North Vietnam has stirred up considerable controversy among veterans of the anti-war movement. Those in the movement who did not sign the ad offer a wide range of reasons, which have emerged in published comments and in the course of an informal survey I conducted. Their objections run as follows:

The charges of torture by the North Vietnamese Government are not supported by any credible evidence, say some; it's all a pack of lies, say others. The Baez statement lacks any historical context. It will serve as a retroactive justification for American intervention in the Vietnam War and our crimes against the Vietnamese. Why single out Vietnam when so many other countries are as bad or worse? It is arrogant of this country to lecture Vietnam, of all countries, considering what it suffered at our hands. Americans should not sit in judgment on the rest of the world; human rights violations in socialist countries should not be criticized; raising these criticisms at this time will merely give comfort to those who oppose recognition of Vietnam and reparations; there are more effective and tactful ways to influence the Government of Vietnam.

The claim that Baez and company lack proof for the charge of torture seems by far the best ground on which to oppose their statement. As it happens, the four people I spoke to who made this criticism all conceded that there are political prisoners in Vietnam as the Baez statement charged, but expressed doubts about the credibility of the refugees on whose statements the charges of torture were based.

Charges of torture are always difficult to confirm. The accused governments invariably deny them, and the practice is most common in closed societies where independent legal inquiries and journalistic investigations are virtually impossible. Victims of the most severe abuses are rarely released to tell the tale, and accusations must often be based on fragmentary in-

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formation. Vietnam's refusal to allow Amnesty International to investigate is troubling, but not conclusive.

What is disturbing, however, is that all those critics who cited lack of proof of torture (including one man who was asked to sign the Baez statement and declined) had other criticisms as well, thus implying that they would have disapproved even if convincing evidence of torture could be produced.

It is one thing to say that the Baez group lacks proof of its allegations of torture, but quite another to charge that the statement is a pack of "anti-Vietnamese lies." This disregards the Vietnamese Government's own acknowledgment that it confines thousands of its citizens in "re-education camps." It also ignores that Government's refusal to allow any impartial investigation of allegations of greater abuses. Proof that Vietnam tortures its citizens may be lacking, but so is proof of the falsity of the statements on which Joan Baez relied. A Government that is widely known to have political prisoners and does not permit independent inquiry is not entitled to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The worst objection to the Baez statement is that it ignores historical context—that Vietnam's long struggle, its wartime sufferings, must be taken into account. But historical context has been invoked to excuse most of the barbarism in the world. Moral absolutes may be few, but they ought to include condemnation of all torture and all imprisonment for political and religious beliefs.

To the criticism that the Baez statement appears retroactively to justify American military intervention in Vietnam and to absolve the United States for its crimes, the answer seems obvious: it will be used that way despite everything the signers do to proclaim their continued denunciation of the U.S. record. The responsibility for such misuse of the Baez statement, however, falls on those who abuse human rights, not on those who decry abuses. Yes, certainly, elsewhere in the world there have been abuses as bad as anything in Vietnam and worse. Yet, like the historical-context argument, this is a treacherously broad principle. Under it everything can be excused: if everyone is guilty, no one is guilty. A government that harries its people deserves to be measured against universal standards of decency, not just against the standards of other countries that may do even worse. According to this logic, criticism of civil liberties abridgments in the United States should be minimal, because, for all its failings, our Government does not treat its citizens as badly as many others do.

Given the enormity of American crimes against Vietnam, it would indeed be arrogant for our Government to criticize human rights violations by the Republic of Vietnam. Yet it hardly seems fair to make that charge against Joan Baez and such signers of her statement as Daniel Berrigan and I.F. Stone, who fought American involvement in the war. Similarly, any claim by American citizens to sit in judgment on human rights abuses in other countries seems to me to derive from their willingness to speak out against violations of liberty at home. The signers of the Baez statement pass that test. The other side of the coin is that those who refuse to criticize violations in socialist countries diminish their status as critics of inhumanity elsewhere.

The likelihood that the United States will use the Republic of Vietnam's human rights record as a pretext for continued refusal to normalize relations or pay reparations is troubling. Ordinarily, I favor economic sanctions against governments that abuse human rights, but Vietnam is an exception. The policies it is now engaged in do not mitigate past wrongs by the United States against the Vietnamese. Reparations—payments for past wrongs—should not be subject to the same conditions as economic aid. While the Baez statement may damage whatever small chance there was that reparations will be paid, here again, the fault lies with those who abuse human rights and not with the messengers who inform the world of these abuses.

Virtually every public denunciation of human rights violations has its detractors who assert that friendly private efforts would be more effective. The few occasions where this criticism has merit involve particular individuals who may be rescued by unpublicized interventions. Cruelties on the scale practiced by the Republic of Vietnam are no more susceptible to this approach than the depredations against Vietnam committed by the United States. Baez and company were right when they went public against the United States for its abuses during the Vietnam War. Now they deserve praise for going public against abuses by the Republic of Vietnam. ARYEH NEIER

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*Aryeh Neier, a member of* The Nation's *Editorial Board, is a visiting professor of law at New York University and a fellow of the New York Institute for the Humanities.*

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# On Intervention

The question was intervention at Columbia University's Kellogg Conference Center on June 9. More than 100 invited scholars, area specialists, journalists, foreign affairs experts and Government officials attended the conference on intervention sponsored jointly by The Nation Institute and the Columbia University School of International Affairs.

The proceedings were organized around four panels: Intervention and Human Rights; Instrumentalities of Intervention: The Cold War; Intervention in the Middle East; and Military Intervention: Is It Ever Justified? Moderators were Aryeh Neier, Blair Clark, Frances FitzGerald and Victor Navasky. The group of commentators on each panel, who took off on a multiplicity of issues raised in the papers published in the special June 9 issue of *The Nation*, sustained a sharp, spirited dialogue that was global in scope yet

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deep in its historical dimensions. As the day wore on, it became clear that this was not merely a conference on a subject but rather a subject in search of a conference, a subject of such compelling moment that it took on a life of its own.

The topic yielded up such a variety of facets that it would be impossible to summarize them here; nor can we offer a handy list of definitive conclusions. Suffice it to say that the right questions were asked and that they ranged from the theoretical—the persisting role of intervention in American foreign policy ("Intervention is American as apple pie," as one participant put it)—to the immediate, e.g., President Carter's decision to go ahead with the MX missile (which provided a text for Daniel Ellsberg, a last-minute panelist) and the revolution in Nicaragua, which, as Cynthia Arnson reports in this issue, has the *Somocistas* on Capitol Hill up in arms.

One thing was clear: the decision to intervene is too important to be left to diplomats and politicians. Independent scholars and citizens outside the Government must continue to raise the questions raised at the conference, define the national interests supposedly at stake in each proposed intervention and bring constitutional, legal, moral and pragmatic standards to bear. We promise to continue the dialogue in these pages.

# Losing Yemen

All the people who fretted about Who Lost Iran have apparently given it up as, well, a lost cause. And so Iran slips back into the limbo of lost nations, along with China, Eastern Europe, Cuba, Angola and all the others over the years. With their lost horizons narrowed, the people who raise the question are probably feeling a bit lost themselves right now. So, although they might misinterpret our solicitude, we would like to propose a new recruit for the Who Lost Brigade: Yemen. It seems only yesterday that the Administration found North Yemen and (with a quiet assist from Saudi Arabia) announced that if we didn't rush $500,000 worth of arms there, North Yemen would slip into the orbit of the powerful, Soviet-backed South Yemenis. But now we hear nothing of Yemen from the Administration. Has it vanished? Did Saudi Arabia buy it? Did it have a 2-for-1 split and become North-South-East-West Yemen?

Those were momentous days, when the President declared an emergency in order to bypass the need for Congressional approval for an arms shipment. It was billed as a ticking crisis; the aircraft carrier *Constellation* was dispatched to the vicinity and, according to defense expert and *Nation* contributor Michael Klare, orders were issued for its planes to shoot down any South Yemeni aircraft manned by Russian or Cuban flyers. The 82nd Airborne Division was also reportedly put on alert.

Actually, of course, the Arab League arranged a cease-fire shortly after the Administration's crisis broke. According to *The Washington Post*, American intelligence officers were not long ago advising against sending the rest of the $500,000 in arms because North Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh is in danger of being ousted (by his own constituents), and there might not be anyone on hand to accept delivery. The same intelligence officers also reported that the Soviet Union had supported the cease-fire and "was more influenced by desires not to antagonize Saudi Arabia than by the implied U.S. military threat." Thus, another chapter in gunboat diplomacy recedes mercifully into the past, and we can only hope that Yemen stays lost.

# What Senter Said

Mississippi Democratic Senator John Stennis has never been in the vanguard of the civil rights movement in the South. So, it comes as no surprise that serious questions about State Judge Lyonel Thomas Senter's commitment to equal justice have not deterred Stennis from backing Senter for a vacancy on the Federal District Court in northern Mississippi.

Civil rights leaders in the state have expressed concern about Senter's role in a vigilante attack on John Lloyd, a black man who was castrated, then shot, by a group of whites in Aberdeen, Miss., in 1948. Lloyd survived the incident and was found in a ditch, apparently left for dead. Senter, who was only 14 at the time, has admitted that he was present when the brutality took place but insists he had nothing to do with it. "I knew what was going on," Senter recently told the Jackson, Miss., *Clarion-Ledger*. "But, I was not part of it."

Senter has also been accused of calling a group of blacks "niggers." The epithet was allegedly directed at members of the United League, a black civil rights group that has led boycotts of white-owned businesses in Mississippi, when they sat down to eat lunch near the speakers' platform at a June 1978 rally in Tupelo for Mississippi Governor Cliff Finch. Senter was on the speakers' platform with Finch, then a candidate for the U.S. Senate. According to an affidavit submitted by United League member May Clinton Standifer to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senter pointed to the United League members and said to Finch: "You ought to get those niggers away from under the tree!" Standifer names two others who also heard the epithet. Senter denies he said it.

The Justice Department has ordered an F.B.I. background check on Senter. We trust that President Carter will give Senter's candidacy a harder look.

DOROTHY J. SAMUELS and JAMES A. GOODMAN

*Dorothy J. Samuels is executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union. James A. Goodman is the Washington, D.C., representative of the Committee for Public Justice, a national civil liberties organization.*

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# ARTICLES.

# SALT

*(Continued From Front Cover)*

*modus vivendi* was established between the two countries that recognized each's spheres of interest. By the 1970s, this quasi-alliance was formalized, and Henry Kissinger—who understood that political and military power make a state conservative, whatever its rhetoric—led the campaign for détente. From the point of view of the Nixon Administration, détente merely codified what had been agreed on for some time: that between them the United States and the Soviet Union had a common interest in preventing challenges to their power, whether from other capitalist states (West Germany, Japan) or other socialist ones (China, the Third World).

The Russians also had much to gain from their new alliance with the United States. Although they are the inheritors of a revolutionary tradition, modern Soviet leaders are exceptionally bureaucratic- and conservative-minded. The Kremlin, particularly since the end of World War II, has seemed far more interested in preserving its power than expanding it. This put it in a double bind at home. On the one hand, Russian leaders needed to offer the Russian people international power and military prestige. On the other, if they achieved this power at the expense of consumer goods and rising standards of living, they ran the risk of undermining the basis of that power. Détente offered them both. They could claim that the United States and the Russians were now equals, ending Russia's traditional inferiority in the world system. And they could put a lid on the arms race so that a larger part of their economy could be devoted to domestic production. In short, the tacit alliance with the United States became the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy by the late 1960s.

The mutual interest the superpowers had in solidifying their new-found friendship led to the successful negotiation of SALT I. The first treaty on strategic arms brought order and predictability to the arms race, although it certainly did not end it. SALT I, indeed, was not arms control at all. It more closely resembled the kinds of restrictive agreements that monopolistic corporations make among themselves to insure a predictable market by keeping out new firms. SALT I cleared the U.S. Senate easily because it was a conservative attempt to freeze the world as it was, rather than a radical attempt to change it.

Pleased by their success at winning domestic support within each country for the first SALT treaty, American and Soviet leaders immediately began negotiations for the second step of the process. The Russians, with their tight control of their political system, never had any doubts that SALT II would be completed and accepted by them. They had every reason to assume that the same would be true of the United States, given the huge margin by which SALT I had been approved. Détente seemed fairly secure, for if a Republican conservative could initiate it, then surely a centrist Democrat could continue it. Both sides had abided by the treaty; there had been no major confrontations between them. Indeed, on a number of ventures, from the settlement in Vietnam to oceanography and space, the two superpowers had strengthened their informal alliance. The operating assumption was that ratification of SALT II would be close to automatic.

What neither the Russians nor the Carter Administration understood was that between the first and second treaties all the subliminal anxieties about America's role in the world that had lain dormant for years would erupt. When the unspoken was articulated, SALT II was in trouble.

American foreign policy, until Vietnam, had been remarkably successful. A strong domestic consensus existed that supported global intervention and an active defense budget. This success, however, was at all times based upon a gentleman's agreement within the foreign policy establishment that certain issues would not be discussed publicly within the United States. Among the "untouchables" were:

§ Despite repeated assertions to the contrary, American foreign policy was not unbendingly anti-Communist. The cold war began as much because the United States was pro-German as anti-Russian; the latter was needed to legitimate the former. (In a series of remarkable contemporary articles, later published as *The Truman Era*, I.F. Stone analyzed the early cold-war period as an attempt to build up German capitalism. Exaggerating the Soviet threat helped win support for this course from an isolationist and anti-European Congress.) Dulles made hawkish speeches, but he never lifted a finger to help the revolts in Eastern Europe. Kennedy was more concerned about the Third World's proclivity toward rapid change than its leaning toward the U.S.S.R. Nixon, for all his rhetoric, found the Russians to be more cooperative allies than the Western Europeans. Anti-Communism was useful to both parties as a means of obtaining other ends, but neither followed through its logical implications when in power.

§ Foreign policy was intensely partisan. Lip service was paid to the notion of bipartisanship, but the truth was that foreign policy changed radically when a new party won the Presidency. The political ritual, however, rarely varied. Democrats would let it be known that they objected to the hawkish extremism of the Republicans but, when in power, would be as hawkish as they dared. Republicans carped at Democratic cowardice but, when they were in power, ended wars, relaxed tensions and cut defense spending.

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§ There always were limits on what the United States could afford to spend for defense. Politicians like to claim that defense is our first priority and that whatever is necessary to protect national security will be done. Yet fear about the drain of heavy defense expenditures runs like a hidden seam through every Administration from Harry Truman's to Jimmy Carter's. Although the public is never told, policy makers have sought to keep defense spending at a level sufficiently high to buoy up the economy, but not so high that it would submerge it.

§ The goal of the United States has not necessarily been to be the number-one military power in the world. It is true that many cold-war militants preach the doctrine of absolute American strategic superiority. But this extreme faith has never appealed to the dominant elite. It has been obvious for some time that the United States could never hope to match the Russian lead in conventional arms. Secretaries of Defense from Robert McNamara to Harold Brown have been content with a de facto equivalence in strategic weapons. (James Schlesinger was a conspicuous exception.) It was not ideal, but in a real world where other countries existed, a rough strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union was the price that had to be paid to keep the informal alliance with the Russians alive.

The opposition to the SALT II treaty reflects the fact that these unspoken assumptions have now surfaced in the public discourse. The Republicans have officially repudiated bipartisanship; foreign policy is perforce now conducted along formal partisan lines (with the Southern Democrats allied with the Republicans as they are on domestic policy). Détente proclaimed to the world that American global strategy was not fixated on anti-Communism; from that moment on, cooperation became as much a part of U.S.-Soviet relations as confrontation. The economic slowdown suggested that there can be too much defense spending—especially in a time of taxpayers' revolt. And finally, PRM-10, the strategic overview of the Carter Administration, recognized an "essential equivalence" between the two superpowers.

A concatenation of events has forced these subliminal issues onto the political agenda. Four seem to be the most important. The American defeat in Vietnam was a key turning point, an obvious sign to the more farsighted members of the foreign policy establishment that something was gravely wrong with the assumptions of postwar policy. The emergence of China as a superpower gravely upset the bipolar world that the United States and the Soviet Union were trying to create. A worldwide economic slowdown has affected both countries; neither can afford unlimited defense expenditures. And, finally, within the United States the old Democratic coalition that had supported both social welfare spending and cold-war militarism foundered and has been unable to right itself since. As these debilities grew critical, U.S.-Russian cooperation became at once more necessary and yet harder to secure.

Thus the main difference between the SALT I and SALT II atmospheres is not, as the right wing charges, that the Soviet Union has become more aggressive. That is gibberish, not even accepted by NATO. What has changed is that the underlying assumptions of postwar policy have been brought into the light; thus exposed, they seem unsupportable.

The debate over SALT II is surreal because of the peculiar history of the cold war. While tension between the Soviet Union and the United States has without question been real, it has always been accompanied by de facto cooperation, which neither country's leadership could ever acknowledge publicly for domestic reasons. In both the Soviet Union and the United States, extremists existed who would have liked to wipe the other power off the face of the earth. Yet the centrist Democrats who rose to power in the United States and the pragmatic power brokers who replaced Stalin did not want an actual confrontation because both elites were conservative above all else, and confrontations destroy everything that has been conserved. Therefore, cold-war rhetoric enabled both elites to remain in power by checking the extremism of militant anti-Communists in one country and militant anti-capitalists in the other. Whatever the rhetoric implied, conservative politics required big-power cooperation. Thus in each country there arose a difference between what can be called a *domestic* foreign policy (hostility toward the antagonist) and a *foreign* foreign policy (informal détente and covert cooperation).

The trick for elites in both the United States and the Soviet Union was to find the right combination of cold-war facade and effective accommodation. This was never easy. There were occasions when the signals were mixed and real confrontations took place (although these were often quickly put right and the balance restored). Moreover, as in domestic economic life, agreements to limit competition are never totally successful: they often become rules governing how competition should take place rather than substitutes for competition itself. Big-power cooperation never completely eliminated rivalries between the two countries, especially in the Third World (a "market" that was less "regulated" than Europe). Finally, the entry of a new "competitor" (like China) is always capable of undermining previous agreements and reinstituting the state of nature, as has taken place in recent years, when U.S.-Soviet rivalry, particularly in Africa, is on the upswing. The informal alliance between the two superpowers never meant the complete elimination of all hostility between them.

Nonetheless, the degree of cooperation that was achieved has to be considered remarkable. Indeed, gradually over time the facade of cold-war hostility began to crumble, and as it did, the reality of big-power cooperation was unveiled. This is not as much of a problem in the Soviet Union as it is in the United States. The Soviet elite had by the 1970s sufficient hold on the state so that cold-war symbols were no longer needed to assuage the militant anti-capitalists.

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But in the United States, the uncovering of the cold-war facade has had serious consequences. American anti-Communists had grown stronger during this time, possibly because the many concessions made to them had had an emboldening effect. Moreover, even with Congress's expanded role in foreign policy, most Congressmen have never been let in on the secret and still think that the Soviet Union is the enemy. For this reason, opposition to SALT II, a treaty that merely continues what has been going on in the world for some time, is much stronger in the United States than in the Soviet Union.

When SALT I was being debated, the gap between the domestic foreign policy and the foreign foreign policy was not as wide as it would later become. Moreover, Nixon, as a conservative Republican, was in an ideal position to win approval for the treaty because he had no need to prove his anti-Communism. But Carter's situation is far more intractable. First, he must apologize for being a Democrat (his party has always felt vulnerable to the charge of being "soft on Communism" even though it has been by far the more belligerent one when in power). But more important, Carter faces a Senate determined not to recognize that the domestic foreign policy has been lost and demanding reassurance that it will be re-established.

The resulting air of unreality places Carter in an awkward position. He could, of course, simply proclaim the truth. He could announce on national television that the Russians and the Americans are, in fact, allies, that this alliance is the only way to insure peace in the world and that SALT must be seen as part of a last-ditch effort to prevent an enormous disequilibrium in international relations. Unfortunately for Carter, if he does this, he directly confutes every stereotype, deception and ideological utterance that has made U.S. foreign policy possible. No politician can afford to take that risk. Therefore, all Carter can do is to push for SALT II—for this is what world order requires; but he can never acknowledge why he is advocating SALT II—for domestic political considerations will not let him. And so he offers concessions to anti-Communism while advocating a treaty that contradicts the assumptions under which those concessions are granted. Only Carter's awkward position can explain why, in order to have "arms control," it is necessary to build more weapons.

But the right-wing position is even more anomalous. The key to understanding the American right is the realization that it has never had to take responsibility for the consequences of its demagogy, for it has never been in power. When Nixon was President, the right was in the relatively safe position of being able to vote for SALT I, for Nixon's sponsorship let them off the hook. But now the right is in a position to defeat the treaty, and it is by no means clear that many right-wing critics relish the power that has suddenly been thrust upon them. Many Senators seem uncomfortable in the position of incipient statesmen, obviously longing for the good old days when they could rant and rave all they wanted about war without having to consider the possibility of fighting one.

What is more, the right faces the insurmountable problem of trying to keep alive a cold war that has long since died. It stresses clichés about American power as though they had always been true. And so the right claims that we must be vigilant against an enemy that is in fact an ally; that we must unite in bipartisan fashion around a policy that is highly partisan; that we must increase defense spending in order to protect a way of life that will be destroyed by increased defense spending, and that we must once again achieve a superiority that we neither had nor wanted. If Carter's position is uncomfortable, the right's position on SALT II is absurd.

Will the SALT II treaty pass a Congress that still tends to act as if the Berlin blockade had just been imposed? Chances are that it will. (One must always, in these matters, hedge one's bets; U.S. Senators are capable of heights of irrationality that no one can foresee.) Already there are signs that the opposition to SALT II has peaked. Key conservatives like Sam Nunn, Howard Baker and Robert Dole have not yet announced against the treaty. Carter seems to have discovered that peace is as popular as war, and may even be more so. The fact is that even the opponents of SALT II understand that, at some level, their arguments simply cannot be taken seriously. When the United States and the Soviet Union have as many nuclear weapons as they do—and when they have cooperated in the past as many times as they have—then the fall of the Shah of Iran or the exclusion of the Backfire bomber from the formal part of the treaty simply do not affect American security one way or the other. It is often said that the right can be induced to vote for the treaty by being given some new weapons that will help protect American security. That is not quite accurate. What the right wants is assurances that a world it understands—in which the Americans and the Russians recognize each other as enemies—is said to exist. When Carter takes the appropriate steps to acknowledge to them that the world has not changed, then SALT II will probably pass.

If this analysis is correct, then the process of ratification will follow a predictable pattern. First, there will be extremely belligerent speeches about the implacable nature of the Soviet threat, replete with cancerous imagery about totalitarian expansion. As a result, the Senate will attach various reservations and codicils to the treaty, the purpose of which will be to register their sentiment that the cold war still does exist. Carter will respond by making statements that he will accept no reservations, but he will gracefully back off from the position at the appropriate time. Meanwhile, so many concessions will be made by Carter to the Pentagon and the right that the approval of SALT II will constitute the biggest arms bonanza since the Middle East "peace" treaty. While all this is taking place in Washington, the Russians will offer to Carter private indications that they can live with the reservations while denouncing them in public. Then an unofficial vote count will be taken. Once passage is

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assured, Carter will determine how many votes he can spare, trading off permission to vote against the treaty to certain fence-sitters in return for support on future water projects. The actual vote will be very close, as it was on Panama, probably a 1- or 2-vote margin.

Much has been written about the dire consequences for the arms race should SALT II fail of ratification. These warnings must be taken seriously. There are a number of cold-war kooks in the United States who want to insure that this country regains a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union, and defeat of a treaty would help them in their plans. Beyond that, defeat of the agreement would strengthen the anti-capitalists in Moscow, for there must be sub rosa opposition to the current leadership's willingness to pay close to any price to get a treaty with the unreliable (and most tricky) Americans. The risks are so great that sane people must urge support of SALT II, whatever its absurdities. Yet while supporting the treaty, people should be aware of the consequences that will follow if it is ratified. For what is at stake in this debate over SALT II is whether it is possible to reconstitute the good old days when the facade of cold-war hostility successfully masked the reality of big-power cooperation. The question at hand is whether the balance between a domestic foreign policy and a foreign foreign policy can be re-established.

At stake with the debate over SALT II, then, is not a choice between whether or not the cold war shall continue but a decision over what kind of cold war we are likely to have. Two possibilities seem likely. If the treaty does lose, then we will have what can be called a Republican cold war. A Republican cold war has the following characteristics. Antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially at the vocal level, is sharp. There are few attempts to emphasize Russian-American cooperation. A major effort is undertaken to increase the U.S. reliance on exotic nuclear weapons (the B-1; the MX missile). But in spite of a flurry of attention to new strategic systems, the actual level of defense spending decreases. There is less talk of a draft. Few direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations in the Third World take place. The world is brought to the brink of nuclear terror, but there are fewer actual hostilities in which the superpowers engage. (As bizarre as it may sound, increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, in itself, is less dangerous, in part because the risks of using them are so high and in part because, since less exotic nuclear weapons can already destroy the world, more elaborate ones will have nothing left to wipe out. The real danger from the defeat of SALT II is not that somebody will deliberately use nuclear weapons; it is that the more that exist, the greater the likelihood of an accident or an uncontrolled contingency.)

Should the SALT II treaty pass, then a Democratic cold-war pattern will be more likely. This pattern is quite different. The treaty will impose substantial limitations on new nuclear weapons, and these limits will, in fact, be respected. Freed from having to pour money down the wasteful hole of strategic systems, the United States will spend its defense dollars on far more usable (and therefore more dangerous) conventional arms. There will be a sharp increase in the defense budget if SALT II is ratified, for reliance on conventional arms means a return to the draft and an expensive campaign to modernize what already exists. The Army will benefit from the ratification of the treaty, just as the Air Force will win if the treaty loses.

Moreover, acceptance of SALT II will increase the chances of some kind of direct engagement of American forces somewhere in the Third World. It really is true that a reliance on strategic weapons leaves a country with less flexibility to meet specific crises. One great advantage that will accrue to the Carter Administration from the treaty's ratification is the




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facilitation of its plans to interpose mobile U.S. forces in crisis situations such as might arise in the Middle East. The most plausible scenario under these conditions is that the Carter Administration would emphasize the facade of the cold war in order to secure the vital U.S. interests in Third World resources. Strategic weapons would be of little use in trying to guarantee the flow of oil, but conventional arms would be most helpful. By emphasizing the Soviet threat from local conflicts, rather than from the nuclear arms race, Carter can use the SALT II treaty to redirect American foreign policy to the crisis points of the 1980s, rather than the 1950s. The problem will be, as it was in the past, how to secure Russian acquiescence in American adventurism. The answer will be, as it was in the past, for the Americans to permit the Soviets to retain control of their vital interests, while emitting public noises of opposition.

One's position on the SALT II treaty should be determined by which type of cold war one prefers. This is simply a way of emphasizing that without a substantial domestic opposition to a global foreign policy for the United States, the choice is between the means to maintain an imperial apparatus, not over whether there should be one. The bottom line on the SALT II debate is that with the exception of a few Senators (Mark Hatfield of Oregon, George McGovern of South Dakota), the real issues simply are not being discussed.

Without a domestic opposition, the major danger to the informal Soviet-American alliance that would be strengthened by the ratification of SALT II will come from the rest of the world. While both the Russians and the Americans try to stabilize bipolar power, the world itself is going through one of its periodic major shake-ups. The entrance of China onto the world scene and the economic success of Japan and Germany raise the question of who is going to be allied with whom in the future. Answers are by no means certain. It only takes a year or two these days to turn an enemy into a friend. Can we be sure that Japan will not ally itself with China or that conservative European governments and the Soviet Union may not forge closer ties (in part to enable the Russians to prevent the coming to power of Eurocommunist parties)? If Israel and Egypt can sign a treaty, what is to prevent Taiwan from looking to Russia or South Africa to China?

In order to exercise maximum leverage on the world that is coming into being, both the United States and the Soviet Union—which remain the two most overwhelming military powers in the world—need to have the greatest flexibility. Reliance on a strategic arms race, in which each feels compelled to outdo the other, is a recipe for paralysis, not flexibility. Elites on both sides recognize that without an arms agreement the world will some day pass the superpowers by. Nobody knows exactly what shape the world of the future will take. For precisely that reason, the two superpowers need SALT II. But also for that reason, SALT II may not be enough. It is doubtful whether, despite their best efforts, any two countries by themselves can stabilize the emerging world order. SALT II may well be the last bipolar strategic-arms limitation treaty. It should be. There are far more countries in the world than the Soviet Union and the United States. Unless the superpowers take genuine steps to share their power with the rest of the world (which neither is likely to do), then no amount of cooperation by the United States and the Soviet Union can insure world peace. That is the reality that the leadership of both countries does not wish to acknowledge. □

THE FRENCH SCHISM

# A Specter Is Haunting Eurocommunism

DANIEL SINGER

*Paris*

Is Europe, like Britain, swinging to the right? Whatever the answer, the State Department need not be haunted, for the time being, by the ghost of Eurocommunism. In the recent Italian elections the Communist Party, for the first time since the war, lost rather than gained votes. In France where, as local cantonal elections have just confirmed, the left has a majority in the country, it is so split as not to be able to contemplate victory in the near future. The recently held congresses of the two protagonists, the Socialists and the Communists, revealed the depth of this division. On closer scrutiny, they also suggested that the vagaries of the European left and the setback of Eurocommunism may both be temporary byproducts of the economic crisis.

The French Communists have just held their congress at St. Ouen in the Red belt of Paris. Three years ago the same suburban sports stadium had housed their previous congress, a triumphant occasion at a time when they seemed poised for victory. In the meantime, the French left has managed to achieve the apparently impossible and squander its chances. The shock of the electoral defeat has affected as well Communist militants, who for years had been told, like the rest, that victory and a radical change in their lives were just around the corner. But this deep disappointment found no echo in the congress hall. At St. Ouen the opposition was conspicuous by its absence. The "critical Communists," as the dissidents call themselves, were too dispersed and poorly organized

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to pass through the "centrally democratic" mincer. The 2,000 or so delegates listened attentively, clapped enthusiastically and voted unanimously. In the ritual uncontroversial debate, all the speakers merely elaborated the main themes set out by Georges Marchais, the Secretary General, in his marathon introductory report.

Relations with the Soviet Union were one important theme. The Secretary General had to justify the assertion in the party theses that Russia's balance sheet since October 1917 has been "globally positive." He started defensively arguing that the Communists had to pick up the challenge because the capitalist mass media were painting in black and showing only the seamy side of the Soviet achievement. He then settled the matter with a simplistic question and answer: "Is it a good thing that these countries have built socialism? Yes, it is a good thing for them and for us." It does not seem to have crossed the mind of Georges Marchais that what these countries are erecting need not necessarily be described as socialism. True, he did restate his party's rejection of any model and its right to criticize the absence of democracy in the Soviet bloc. But after years of significant departure from the Soviet orbit this is no longer enough. As long as French Communists will not be permitted to question the very nature of the Soviet regime they will stand still on this issue. Indeed, in the last few months, they have been advancing backward.

France and the future of the left were even more relevant, though on this score Marchais was in no mood for balanced judgments. The Socialists, and they alone, must shoulder the blame for the defeat, and the Communist Party was, nevertheless, right to sign a Common Program with them, back in 1972. Here, one could detect the only hint of self-criticism: this Common Program did create "illusions," thus allowing the Socialists to gain strength and to reveal their real nature as servants of the bourgeoisie. As speaker after speaker hammered at the same points, one could not help wondering why the line now presented as a panacea—"unity at the base," i.e., pressure on the movement from below—could not have been combined with the previous policy of negotiations at the top.

Unwittingly, Marchais may have provided a key to the change of the Communist line with his emphasis on the gravity of the economic crisis (described in curiously un-Marxist terms as "essentially national"). The situation, he proclaimed, is fundamentally different from what it used to be. The alternative now is between the management of the crisis in the interests of big business or a radical transformation of society. After such fighting words, one waited in vain for the elaboration of this radical strategy. Whereas yesterday every social struggle had to be subordinated to the electoral timetable, today global perspectives, whether revolutionary or electoral, have vanished altogether. Militants are told to fight on every front all the time, but the dazzling long-term prospect is our

old friend "the union of the left," i.e., an alliance with the very same Socialist villains.

Commentators here have concluded that the Communists have gone back into their bunker. Judging by the proceedings of the congress and the ensuing reshuffle at the top, the prospect is more complicated. Thus, Roland Leroy, the editor of *L'Humanité*, the party paper, was always known as the chief opponent of the alliance with the Socialists. The break, in September 1977, could be taken as a victory for him, and the recent congress endorsed the very same line ("unity at the base," as interpreted here, can be translated as no unity at all). Yet, at St. Ouen, Leroy was downgraded: he stays in the Politburo, but is removed from the narrower secretariat. Marchais, on the contrary, who for years had been the main practitioner of the alliance, emerged from the congress in an enhanced position. He was re-elected Secretary General. He promoted several of his protégés into the leading party organs. He was the undoubted star of the St. Ouen show. The Communists have chosen to march into political wilderness, leaving their leader the option to march them back again at some future date.

For their Socialist ex-partners this is small comfort, particularly since it is not clear whether this change of course will take place before or after the Presidential election of 1981. Still, it should strengthen Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand's conviction that sooner or later the Communists are bound to accept their appointed place. Because the Socialists, at their Metz congress in April, have also re-elected him their first secretary. But Mitterrand is no longer the undisputed leader. He is now openly challenged by an ambitious newcomer, Michel Roccard, who from his long translation through the far left has preserved only the vocabulary; his moderate policies are clothed in the language of the New Left.

That Mitterrand should have won makes sense. For millions of Frenchmen he still is the symbolic champion of a united left. For Socialists he is the man who found their party in shambles at the Epinay congress

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in 1971 and turned it into the strongest electoral party in France. Yet it is also logical that his leadership should now be questioned, because last year's electoral defeat marked the collapse of his whole strategy.

Francois Mitterrand, though only 62 years old, has a long political past behind him. Under the Fourth Republic he was known as an astute and flexible politician. Under the Fifth (i.e., since Charles de Gaulle's return to power in 1958), he has been strikingly consistent. His strategy has rested on two basic assumptions: that the left cannot win without Communist support; that such a victory is not acceptable unless the non-Communist left has a dominant position in this alliance. He probably reached his climax in the Presidential election of 1974, when he not only nearly defeated Válery Giscard d'Estaing but won credit for making the Communists go out of their way to reassure the electorate and proclaim the limits of their ambitions. Last year, on the contrary, they refused to play second fiddle. They opted for a break and the resultant defeat.

Why? In all the post-mortems the emphasis has been put on the Communist refusal to be the junior partner in the coalition. And rightly so, as even today the Communists claim that to redress the balance of the left is the condition indispensable for resuming united action. Yet the explanation is not sufficient, since in 1974 they had openly accepted the junior position. Marchais gave a hint of what had changed in the meantime: the Communists have become aware of the seriousness of the economic crisis. They did not wish to be junior partners and to have to insure at the same time "social peace" on the shop floor in the worst possible circumstances. But the political consequences of the economic crisis are not limited to the French Communist Party. They point to the present dilemma of Eurocommunism as a whole.

The name is a misnomer. Marx, who invented revolutionary change for the advanced European countries, would have dismissed it as a pleonasm. The neologism nevertheless describes an important historical trend leading the Western Communist parties to a break with the Soviet model and, therefore, to the search for their own strategies and methods of organization. On the first score the change is both tremendous and unfinished. The breakup of the monolith, initiated by Stalin's death, was precipitated by Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956 and accelerated by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia twelve years later. In the West, the Italian Communists first did the running. They were subsequently overtaken by their Spanish comrades. Even the French, once the most Stalinist of the lot, staked out their distance from Russia. In view of the zeal with which Communist parties used to obey Moscow's most contradictory orders, their present refusal to conform provides a striking contrast.

And yet the divorce is far from completed. Western Communist leaders, with the possible exception of the Spaniard Santiago Carrillo, prefer to criticize Russia for individual acts rather than to ponder over the nature of a regime capable of perpetrating such crimes. Besides, as we saw in the case of the French, recent months have been a period of retreat rather than offensive on this front. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that, sooner rather than later, the Western schism will come about. The big Communist parties of Western Europe cannot parade as paragons of liberal virtue while preserving a special link with Russia. Their immersion in the political life of their countries will drive them to a break. Indeed, the recent retreat reflects a slowing down, and a possible reversal, in this process of integration. Which brings us to the other aspect of the same story.

Eurocommunism may one day be described as the late offspring of the great Western postwar boom, the quarter of a century of unparalleled prosperity, when capitalism seemed to have discovered the secret of eternal youth. If you can't lick them, join them. One after another, Western Communist parties re-entered the system hoping to change it from within. They thus followed in the footsteps of the social democrats. (I am referring here historically, say, to the German social democracy that existed before World War I and not to its British or German caricatures of today.) The trouble was that by the time of their conversion the illusion was vanishing. The days of the growing economic pie, with its generous welfare slices for all, were drawing to an end. But a "social contract," as even the British Labor Party was to find out, requires a counterpart; workers want something in exchange for tightening their belts. A compromise, historical or otherwise, in Italian or any other language, cannot last without give and take.

Eurocommunist parties did not react in the same fashion to the economic crisis. The Italians went openly to the rescue of the system, on the assumption that they might reform it from the inside. They gradually discovered that the Christian Democratic establishment had nothing to offer them, not even ministerial side-seats, while their own rank and file were getting restless with pleas for sacrifices. Shortly before the recent election, Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer was forced to return to open opposition in hopes of avoiding an electoral disaster. The French Communists, for their part, behaved last year as if the crisis did not exist. For France, they preached a Japanese rate of growth—and chose to lose the election. Now, admitting the crisis, they seek temporary shelter in the political wilderness.

The whole European left, Communist and Socialist alike, seems bewildered by the new historical period in which it is no longer possible to respond to the capitalist challenge by chanting "anything you can do we can do better. . . ." Now it is necessary to offer something different, another conception of growth, another mode of producing and consuming, a different division of labor and a different way of life. As long as the European left does not evolve radical responses that are in tune with the new situation, it would not know what to do if an electoral victory were surprisingly thrust upon it.

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On second thought, however, the State Department should start worrying now. Had it been wise, it would have encouraged, instead of sabotaging, the earlier phase of Eurocommunism, which was destined to integrate the Communist parties into the system. That phase is temporarily in abeyance, and it is not clear what will follow. Besides, the European left is not alone in being at a loss. Europe's capitalist establishment, while reacting to the crisis in classical fashion—by trying to restructure the economy, to cut real wages, to increase mobility; briefly, to recapture the conquests of a victorious labor movement—has no long-term vision either. Hence, the strange atmosphere of twilight pervading Europe today, of which Italy—where the state is more decomposed, society in greater decay—provides the extreme illustration. A reign is clearly a-dying, though nothing is apparently emerging to take its place. The only worrying question is how long such an interlude can last. □

THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS

# Communists in Coats and Ties

CHARLES C. MANN

*Rome*

Shattering the expectations of most major Italian politicians, on June 3 and 4, Italian voters passed a complex and generally negative judgment on their current governing formula, the "historic compromise"—a unique, not particularly successful attempt to solve the irreconcilable differences between Catholic and Communist parties in Parliament by a coalition Government. Thirteen months after the terrorist murder of Aldo Moro, the architect of the deal binding Christian Democrats, Communists, Socialists and minor parties in a Government of "national unity," the Italian electorate voiced its dissatisfaction with constant compromise and stasis. But the voters spoke so ambiguously that the net result could be a compromise Cabinet dominated by those same factions.

The much-ballyhooed "swing to the right" failed to materialize. Political pundits were instead viewing the vote in terms of a "victory for anti-bipolarism," "return of the lay center" and the "ghettoization of big labor"—to cite only a few samples of the instant analyst's art turned out on election night.

The tally makes an already complex and overheated political climate more complicated. Thus, while the Communist shadow Economic Minister, Georgio Napolitano, was declaring on television that, despite his party's first-ever electoral decline, "The results don't seem to have substantially changed the political picture," on another channel, pudgy Socialist boss Benedetto (Bettino) Craxi, whom the newspapers had crowned "King maker," was too upset at the results to answer coherently reporters' questions.

The polls predicted that the attempt of both the right-wing Socialists and Christian Democrats to ride the conservative tide elsewhere in Europe would reap an electoral bonanza—but the polls were wrong. The Socialists increased by perhaps .2 percent and the Christian Democrats, singing the anti-Red tune of the past, dropped by .5 percent. "Craxi better play his king-maker role well," a source close to the party says. "Or else he's out." The Socialists are now acutely sensitive to the dangers of being relegated to a minor party position. Craxi's aggressively right-wing campaign was designed to pick up votes. Since it failed, the party is now in an awkward position. It will continue to lose if it is identified too closely in a new coalition Government with the corrupt Christian Democrats—who stand for precisely the "message of the past" it has attacked. If it allies with the Communists, it may lose its identity.

The Socialists were badly hurt by their long alliance with the Christian Democrats in a series of "center-left" Governments beginning in the 1960s. The Communists similarly lost credibility as a force for change when they joined the national unity Government later. To understand how these self-destructive acts came about, it is necessary to backtrack a bit.

At the time of the last elections, in 1976, the Christian Democrats were as weak as they have ever been in their thirty-year hold on power. The nation was horrified—and justly so—at the almost daily revelations of financial hanky-panky, cover-ups of coup plots and even murder. The result was that the Communists increased their support by nearly a third, to 34 percent of the vote. Much of the new support came from the 5.3 million newly enfranchised 18-year-olds and the perennially underdeveloped South. The Christian Democrats in turn slipped to 39 percent of the total vote.

Fearful of American destabilization efforts, Communist Party Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer proceeded to make what now seems the appalling error of entering into a pact with the Catholics, mostly on their terms. "They wanted to be respectable," says one young Roman. "So they put on coats and ties. Then they got their little bit of power and now you can't tell them from all the other awful people with coats and ties and little bits of power who aren't doing a damn thing."

In addition, the Christian Democrats' right wing, led by six-time Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, set a high price for even token agreement with the left. Fanfani also hoped to profit from law-and-order sentiment arising out of popular revulsion against Red Brigades terrorism. He was echoed by Craxi, who

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waged an, at times, virulently anti-Communist campaign in an attempt to raise the Socialists' low 10 percent share of the vote.

After the murder of Aldo Moro, the only Christian Democratic leader able to quell the ever-present interparty squabbles, Fanfani's star rose. The Christian Democrats dragged their feet on promised, vitally needed domestic reforms, such as cleaning up the corrupt bureaucracy and land reform in the South. Confronted with the *fait accompli* of Italy's admission into the European Monetary Union, the Communists walked out. They felt they had given the Christian Democrats the three years of austerity and labor peace necessary to restore Italy's international credit rating and had received nothing in return.

But the pro-Communist wave had crested. Voters in the South—traditionally conservative people who, after years of governmental neglect, switched in protest to the Communists in 1976—returned to their customary political habits. In Naples, a collapsing city with an appalling unemployment problem, the Communist vote fell by 8 percent. Nationwide it dropped 4 percent. "I voted for the Communists last time because I thought they'd do something," a Neapolitan vendor of smuggled cigarettes says. "This time I'm taking my ballot and drawing a nice little pig on it just to stick them all. Maybe I might even vote Fascist. I don't know."

If Italians withdrew their votes from the Communists and didn't reward the other two major parties, a group of long-dormant minor parties and one new name, the Radicals, were the big winners. Social Democrats, Liberals, Republicans and the United Proletarian Democracy all increased their representation by 1 percent, meaning that their votes will be solicited for a new compromise Government.

The sole exception to this trend and possibly the strongest expression of voter displeasure with the "old methods" that every party has promised to overcome was the strength shown by the Radicals, who tripled their representation across the country. Led by media-conscious Giacinto (Marco) Panella, known for his remarkable twenty-year dedication to nonviolent social protest, libertarian causes, hunger strikes and flamboyant filibusters, the Radicals have gathered together all those who fled the far-left groups, which dithered about denouncing the Red Brigades, in the wistful hope that the terrorists were simply extroverted, overexcited social reformers. This group may possibly become the non-Marxist left opposition that Italy has never had. They appeal especially to the alienated, chronically unemployed young, who have despairingly let the campuses fall silent.

Leonardo Sciascia, a distinguished Sicilian novelist and critic whose recent defection from the Communist Party signaled the party's loss of moral authority, noted in his campaign speeches for the Radicals: "This country is starved for a true opposition. Communists and Christian Democrats are not just allies today: they are two mirror images, each the reflection of the other. It's been like that for thirty years. It's time to break up the complicity." Needless to say, the Radicals' deliberate attempts to act as gadflies have been violently attacked by both Catholics and Communists. The party's emergence is a disquieting signal to the old centers of power, a signal they will likely ignore.

Expressing the confidence of the traditional parties that the results mean business as usual was Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, a cold and shrewd political animal, who said immediately after the election, "It seems to me the line of solidarity . . . hasn't really been defeated by the elections." Andreotti, who has staked his future on alliance with the Communists, could hardly have been displeased by the voters' failure to respond to his rightist rival, Fanfani.

Although the Communists seem more likely to evolve into special representatives of big labor than the authentic multi-class movement they hoped to become, the lack of support for the Socialists and Christian Democrats and the growth of the minor parties means an even greater fragmentation of the political picture. Such fragmentation—with no side being able to gather enough support to form a truly stable government—was the cause of the historic compromise. The voter protest against the compromise seems to have, paradoxically, strengthened the basis for its continuance, while torpedoing those leaders who had most to gain from its collapse. "Can they govern without us?," Communist Party Senate President Pietro Ingrao asked two days before the election. "And at what price? The labor unrest that forced them to include us last time?"

At the risk of making a prediction which could be proven wrong immediately, the most likely alternative seems to be some reworking of the governing formulas of the last three years and thus the continuation of what Sciascia calls "that great criminal experiment"—current Italian politics. □

A WIN-NER FOR 1980

# Anti-Inflation For Progressives

BERTRAM M. GROSS

Everyone talks about inflation, but, unlike the weather, a few people actually do something—they push prices higher. The industrial-military complex conjures up new forms of inflationary spending on multi-billion-dollar overkill. The energy-auto-highway complex raises prices di-

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rectly. The hospital-doctor-drug company complex jacks up hospital charges by 14 percent a year. The food conglomerate-factory-farm-supermarket complex aims to do as well. The banking-Federal Reserve complex pushes up interest rates (real as well as nominal) to enhance bank profitability. The city hall-real estate-planning commission complex encourages the kind of speculative development that shoots up rents, land prices and the cost of new housing.

The President's Council of Economic Advisers, set up under law to fight unemployment, turns hopefully to increased unemployment to bring inflation rates down to levels that might be politically more tolerable. Chanting litanies of "demand pulls" and "cost pushes," they drown out the warning murmurs of profit inflation and a coming profit-induced recession. President Carter goes them one better by pandering to the conservative nonsense that inflation is caused by the Federal deficit. "Blaming the victims isn't enough," the motto seems to be. "Hide the victimizers too." It now turns out that the very inflation that is supposedly created by the deficit raises Federal tax revenues (through "bracket creep") and thus is cutting the deficit. If at the same time it unbalances the budgets—and partially wipes out the savings—of most Americans, that merely shows, in one of Carter's most-quoted phrases, that "life is unfair."

In this kind of economic weather, life takes on new perplexities. Myriad millions, brought up on faith in the almighty dollar, find that their own hard-won dollars are not so mighty. For union members, this means declining faith in unions. For technicians and professional people, it means greater uncertainty and more competitive rat races. For the poor and the elderly it means greater helplessness and alienation. In "The Witches' Sabbath," Thomas Mann described inflation in these memorable words:

> There is neither system nor justice in the expropriation and redistribution of property resulting from inflation. A cynical "each man for himself" becomes the rule of life. But only the most powerful, the most resourceful and unscrupulous, the hyenas of economic life, can come through unscathed. The great mass of those who put their trust in the traditional order, the innocent and the unworldly, all those who do productive and useful work, but don't know how to manipulate money, the elderly who hoped to live on what they earned in the past—all those are doomed to suffer. An experience of this kind poisons the morale of a nation. . . . Inflation is a tragedy that makes a whole people cynical, hardhearted and indifferent.

If Thomas Mann had lived to see today's combination of inflation and unemployment (the dominant characteristic of present-day capitalism), I am sure he would have found equally tragic the paradox of mass alienation coupled with hyperactive politics by contemporary "hyenas of economic life."

One might expect that American progressives in the largest First World democracy would have some sort of national anti-inflation program. After all, to quote the spring newsletter of the Institute of Social Research, "Virtually every piece of evidence we have indicates that consumers place inflation at the very top of any list of serious economic and social problems—above unemployment, crime, war, racial siege, or urban decay." But just as much evidence shows that inflation is at the very bottom of every list of liberal or radical programs for economic or social reform or structural change.

Why? One reason is that the mythmakers of the banking establishment have secured a monopoly on the inflation-fighter image. This helps them raise their own prices—that is, interest rates. A byproduct of the conservatives' dominant role is that many progressives feel that opposing inflation might tarnish their liberal or radical image. Advocates of genuine full employment have thus become incapable of fighting for both full employment and price stability. They fear that the mandatory price controls essential in any serious fight against inflation could be used to curb labor, while also allowing price increases through leaky controls or sky-high ceilings. Tighter price controls, on the other hand, tend to control profits unless the corporations curtail production of lower-cost items, shift to luxury goods and move their capital to ceiling-free sectors of America or the world. Thus, as the conservatives gleefully point out, price controls necessitate other controls that might lead in the direction of socialism.

Many liberals and socialists, however, see these controls leading instead toward a stronger, more insidious and more dangerous corporate state. Others feel that direct involvement in such matters of national policy means getting caught on the flypaper of electoral, technocratic and bureaucratic politics; they feel that creative energies should be concentrated on small-scale mobilization efforts at the so-called grass roots. Finally, some of the most innovative people in the new American revival of Marxism take the purist position that nothing serious can be done on these matters until somehow or other the system is first changed from capitalism to socialism. These reservations are not failures of nerve or analysis; they derive from the objective contradictions that crop up in any efforts to reform or transform capitalism.

There are many ways of dodging these contradictions. A "radical" style is to sit back and wait until the continuing crisis of modern capitalism brings about the long-postponed collapse. A liberal method is to plunge into electoral politics without explicitly articulating this particular issue. A sad illustration of the latter is the sequence of suicidal campaigns by Bella Abzug. In her Senatorial run against Daniel P. (Benign Neglect) Moynihan, I confidently waited for her to pull a loaf of bread out from under her hat and a Con Ed bill from her handbag and launch a campaign against inflation. In the following year's mayoralty campaign in New York City, I was still hoping that she might become the symbol of consumer resentment against price profiteering, but she didn't. One of her supporters confided to me that a mayor could not do anything about prices anyway. Meanwhile, her major opponent grabbed the

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issue of capital punishment, which is not a frequent practice at City Hall, and ran away with the nomination. As inflation worsened in the following year, she continued her abstention and succeeded in committing political suicide three times in a row.

In the 1980 primaries and elections, I see the possibility of such suicides on a mass scale. By that time inflation will be a more open issue. It is already being opened up by right-wing extremists trying to harness popular resentment against rising prices, rents, interest rates and taxes. In California this has taken the form of Proposition 13 to cut local real estate taxes and the "Son of 13" to put a ceiling on local and state spending. Similar propositions are being pushed in most of the grass-roots constituencies. Nationally, the drive for Federal budget-balancing—whether by Carter's or Congress's cuts in social programs, a Congress-initiated constitutional amendment or a constitutional convention dominated by "We the Political Hacks"—moves on apace. (See Gross, "Unbalancing the Constitution," *The Nation*, April 28.) Whether consciously intended as such or not, this drive serves as a decoy that distracts attention from profit gouging, war spending, shortage manufacture or exploitation, speculation and other inherent aspects of the oligarchic relationships euphemistically referred to as "the market." Those liberal candidates who decide to ride this conservative wave will be swept under—unless they outdo the right-wingers in kowtowing to the big business-big government partnership.

Fortunately, there is a countercurrent at work. In pursuing their own ends, the profit maximizers, profiteers and profit gougers have provoked widely diffused demands for anti-inflation action by government at all levels—local, state and national—and by elected and appointed officials. Some of these demands are embodied in scattered, tentative actions already initiated. Equally important, there are many currents of citizen action outside the normal channels of consultation, pressure and electoral politics: namely, self-help, co-ops, protests, boycotts, demonstrations and nonviolent confrontations. In large part, therefore, the old question "What is to be done?" can be answered by considering what is *already* being done. Most of the specifics in a comprehensive and broad-based anti-inflation program do not have to be invented by ivory-tower theorists or deep thinkers. They can be found by simply looking for them.

I first caught on to this after reading an article by Derek Shearer, a U.C.L.A. lecturer on urban planning, on how Gov. Jerry Brown of California could fight inflation in ways other than his demagogic call for a budget-balancing constitutional convention. Every measure that Shearer proposed for California was something already attempted elsewhere in the country or, in some cases, in Canada. So I suggested to Shearer that we try to list such efforts more comprehensively, including citizen action anywhere as well as national and local policies. The result is the table "Some Specifics of a Progressive Anti-Inflation Program."

A quick look at this table reveals that inflation is not to be stopped, like a hole in the dike, with a one-finger panacea. First of all, the table illustrates the need for tough-minded government action on many fronts—direct controls over prices, rents and interest rates and major expansions in public credit, power, housing and transport. Each of these points requires some elaboration. Government price ceilings are needed in two places primarily—administered-price sectors, where control should be shifted away from

## Some Specifics of

| | *Government Actions Advocated or Initiated* |
|---|---|
| | *Federal* |
| 1. Price Controls | Permanent, selective controls, starting with *Fortune* 500<br>Opposing Carter on decontrol and anti-control |
| 2. Spending | Cut war budget and corporate subsidies<br>Regulate capital flight and foreign investment |
| 3. Taxing | Close major loopholes<br>General fund financing of social security |
| 4. Credit | Reduction of interest rates<br>Credit allocation<br>Activation of new national co-op bank<br>Promote credit unions |
| 5. Energy | Public corporations for oil imports and energy development<br>Major shift to solar, biomass and neglected hydro energy, as well as hard and soft coal |
| 6. Transport | Massive mass transport expansion and improvement<br>Require more efficient, safer cars |
| 7. Housing | Revive public housing for both rehabilitation and new construction |
| 8. Food | Less price support for agribusiness and factory farms<br>Family farm aid<br>Promote direct marketing<br>More anti-trust action |
| 9. Medical Care | National health service<br>Regulation of medical-drug-hospital costs |
| 10. Insurance | Public insurance companies<br>Clear-wording laws |

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oligarchic companies, and shortage areas, such as middle- and low-income rental housing, where competitive markets lead to rampant speculation and inflation. Price ceilings can be administered properly only by a permanent agency which, like the Office of Price Administration during World War II, builds up the skills, knowledge and enforcement capability necessary for effective and appropriate action on freezes, rollbacks, pass-throughs, production orders, price subsidies and the necessary exceptions for small business. Unlike fire engines, these arts cannot be summoned into existence at the sound of an alarm, nor should they be liquidated when the flames subside. Only with a commitment to genuine rather than ritualistic price control is it just or realistic to impose ceilings or guidelines on wage and salary increases. That is why the term "price-wage controls" is preferable to "wage-price controls," customarily used by political leaders and economists who conceal their softness on profits by flaunting their toughness toward labor. More substantively, it is essential to dramatize some facts that most establishment economists have been effectively hiding: higher wages need not raise labor costs if productivity or output levels

# A Progressive Anti-Inflation Program

| *State* | *Local* | *Citizens' Actions (in addition to Inquiry, Advocacy and Electoral Politics)* |
|---|---|---|
| Tough utility regulation<br>Public interest advertising | City price commissions<br>Extensive consumer education, dealing with product quality as well as prices and helping in comparison shopping | Monitor sellers<br>Monitor public officials at all levels<br>Widespread initiatives in consumer self-education and protest |
| Reduce business subsidies<br>More efficient public administration | Reduce tax abatements<br>More efficient public administration | Protest welfare handouts to corporate rich and local speculators<br>Support public officials who resist private pressures |
| Anti-speculation taxes<br>Progressive income taxes<br>Lower taxes for homeowners | Anti-speculation taxes<br>Less reliance on sales taxes<br>Lower taxes for homeowners | Tax-reform initiatives<br>Tax withholding under certain circumstances |
| State banks<br>Productive use of pension funds | Municipal banks<br>Productive use of pension funds | Protest redlining<br>Withdraw deposits from certain banks<br>Withhold mortgage payments under certain circumstances |
| Anti-trust actions against oil companies<br>State power generation and distribution | Municipal public power, with elected consumer representation on boards | Anti-nuke demonstrations<br>Install solar devices<br>Voluntary conservation and recycling |
| Improved land-use planning to minimize trips to work | Bicycle lanes<br>Free downtown buses<br>Mini-buses | More bicycling and walking<br>More car pools |
| Low-interest loans for rehabilitation and new housing<br>Public land purchase and maintenance | Rent control<br>More public rehabilitation, construction and co-op promotion<br>Public land purchase<br>Zoning to prevent, not promote, speculation | Oppose condominium movements, gentrification, planned shrinkage and shortage-creating demolitions<br>Tenant unions and rent strikes |
| Promotion of co-ops<br>Consumers on marketing boards<br>Consumer protection laws and enforcement | Promotion of co-ops<br>Sponsor farmers markets<br>Consumer protection laws and enforcement | Consumer co-ops, food gardens<br>Boycotts<br>Protest automatic checkout scanners |
| Support health co-ops<br>Cost regulation | City-owned health maintenance organizations, health promotion education in schools | Self-care in home; improved diet; more physical exercise and activity; client-controlled health clinics |
| State insurance companies<br>Better consumer information | City insurance<br>Better consumer information | Buy term life insurance only<br>Protest discriminatory auto rates |

Prepared by Derek Shearer and Bertram M. Gross, with the help of Hunter College undergraduates

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

also rise; in capital-intensive activities, labor costs are a small part of total costs and increases in them can often be easily absorbed; and the moral basis for wage constraint is impaired, if not wrecked, by astronomical executive salaries which in some cases, when all sources of income are included, now exceed $2 million a year.

But effective price and rent controls that protect minority needs will cause the banks and industry to shift credit, investment and production into areas that offer greater opportunities (or guarantees) for profit-making. The customary response to this process is to drop controls like a hot brick while making ritual obeisance to the great god of "the market." The only progressive response is (*1*) the kind of supplementary controls that maintain production of lower-cost items, provide for rationing where necessary, allocate credit to areas of social need and (*2*) a return to, expansion and restructuring of many of the old New Deal programs in public banking, power, resource development, conservation and housing. All this, of course, requires democratic planning.

Second, the activities summarized by the table help counter "either-or" approaches that set national against local action. The struggle over inflation is not a battle to be waged in Washington alone; those who concentrate their efforts at any one level should have enough perspective to understand the importance of—and make contact with—the other levels. The broad spectrum of programs needed helps destroy the myth that progressive government action alone, supported by dedicated civil servants and selfless academic advisers, can cope effectively with the inflationary crisis—let alone with unemployment, militarism, racism, sexism, ageism or authoritarianism.

In *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed and How They Fail*, Frances Piven and Richard Clowar have demonstrated the power of mass defiance an confrontation in effectuating social change. One nee not join them in belittling electoral politics and advo cacy in order to appreciate the importance of citize action outside the normal channels of representativ government. Indeed, their point applies not only t the minorities for whom they speak but also to man other elements in society without whose support th poor will generally fail. The anti-nuclear demonstra tions (focused more on the inherent dangers of nu clear power than on its costliness), consumer boycott and rent strikes that have already taken place poin the way toward much more active citizen mobiliza tion—including nonviolent civil disobedience—in th future. Nor can these more militant forms of actio be separated from the widespread growth of self-hel activities—from private gardens and personal healt care to consumer and producer co-ops—that promot self-reliance and a greater measure of freedom fro media-induced consumerism. All these activitie serve to create a climate in which public employees a all levels—particularly those responsible for contro and for public credit, power, resource developmen housing and transport—may be more responsive articulated public needs and less to corporate gree

Strangely enough, this also has a bearing on eff ciency in public administration. Although moder management techniques by themselves can cut ou lays, they have no direct bearing on the selection those whose interests are to be served or the quality the services rendered. Thus, in public agencies, a with transnational conglomerates, "improved ma agement" tends to inflate social costs, undermine m rale at the lower levels and promote corruptio particularly at the higher and middle levels. If th public service is to be expanded, as required by ar serious efforts to combat stagflation, its social eff ciency depends on pressure upon the public bureau racy from both mass organizations at the botto and from political leaders beholden to those at th bottom. Only by this pincer-type pressure, which op erated upon some public agencies during the Ne Deal and World War II, can the deadheads b squeezed out and the creative powers of many peop in public employment be unleashed.

But between the lines of all the activities listed i the table—and perhaps the many other actions tha are now being proposed or undertaken some place i this vast country—any close observer can easily fin an unwritten strength and an underlying weaknes The strength is moral. The activists on these man fronts invariably know in their hearts that extren ism in the pursuit of profits and power is sinful. Th weakness is political. The interests articulated by th activists are still scattered and disjointed. As a resul there is too little expression of their deep relation t other evils intertwined with stagflation—not onl militarism but also sexism, ageism, racism and au thoritarianism. There is as yet no bringing together- "aggregation" in the words of some political scien tists—of these many mutual interests into th

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olitical networks or coalitions that might break rough the false consciousness curtains drawn ross the eyes of America by the mass media.

The pragmatic futurist may well speculate on the tent to which these counterestablishment currents ay converge during the 1980 elections—not only in e Presidential primaries, conventions and electoral mpaigns but also the many contests at Congressional, state, county and municipal levels. A lot will depend on the extent to which major trade unions alvanize their rank-and-file members with the issue protecting the value of the money in their pay envepes. Any such effort could only help in the organizaon of the unorganized, who may be as much pressed by landlords, utility companies, energy ices and grocery bills as by anti-union employers. ith these gut issues involved, such national organitions as the Progressive Alliance could build local liances of considerable scope and power—so long as eadquarters elitism" is avoided and rank-and-file itiatives are allowed full leeway, if not positively enuraged. I see no political inconsistency between the unciation of more radical anti-inflation programs minor party or nonpartisan campaigns and the loption—probably over the objections of the Carter urtiers—of a truly progressive anti-stagflation proam at the Democratic Party convention. The existce of the former might well contribute to the iances of the latter.

At the same time, an anti-inflation program that imposes certain controls on the levels and uses of profits could not possibly eliminate capitalist profit-seeking. By curbing eculation and windfall gains, it could help avoid the dden drastic losses or bankruptcies recessions endnder among firms lacking the power to get comnsatory bail-outs from government. Indeed, many all- and medium-sized firms—and a few larger es—might come to understand that stabler and rger aggregate profits over the longer run might mpensate for what they lose by lower rates of rn and decreased power over the use of profits. This the kind of reluctant understanding that the Swedh Social Democrats, backed by more radical parties d the largest trade union movement in Europe, rced on most Swedish firms during recent decades. America, however, massive public disgust with g-business profiteering is not backed up by either a rge trade union movement or a strong socialist resence. Therefore, the same degree of forced tutege is unlikely. The most that can be expected is that e business element can be divided and that some rogressive business people will run the risk of being randed "traitors to their class" and join in supporting all or part of a progressive anti-inflation rogram.

While a progressive anti-inflation program could elp immeasurably in winning elections at many levs, its basic substance—like the nice words on full nployment in the 1976 Democratic platform—could e forgotten or perverted during the first 100 days of the new Administration, whether it be Kennedy's, Carter's or guess-whose. Or else the extension of public control, if actually carried out, might—as I have already indicated—lead further down the road to corporate-state serfdom. But these are the inherent risks of popular politics in the present era of state-supported, oligarchic capitalism. Nor is there any guarantee of continuing victories, small or large, in any locally based, nationwide struggle against stagflation—particularly in the short run. The only sure thing in this picture is that political failure is guaranteed by the continuation of the present combination of local scatteration and national inactivism in the face of the inflationary specter. □

CHARGE UP CAPITOL HILL

# Saving Somoza

CYNTHIA ARNSON

With the Sandinist guerrillas in Nicaragua locked in deadly battle with President Anastasio Somoza Debayle's National Guard, U.S. policy in Central America is facing a critical test. For many Nicaraguans conscious of their history, the central question is what form U.S. intervention in Nicaraguan affairs will take.

The question of intervention has been elevated to crisis proportions on all sides of the conflict. In early June, Somoza stormed to the Organization of American States threatening to declare war on Costa Rica and requesting that a regional defense pact be invoked. On Capitol Hill, Nicaraguan Government officials waved "Communist-type rocket launchers" and "U.S. M-1 carbines bought by Panamanian agents" before sympathetic Congressional opponents of the Panama Canal treaty. Sandinists, too, have denounced international intervention in Nicaragua, claiming the presence of Salvadoran and Guatemalan troops and Korean and Vietnamese mercenaries.

But while the international tensions heat up, the focus of U.S. policy makers is riveted on Nicaragua's internal political situation. "I do not want to see a Sandinist victory," said a top Pentagon official recently. That position has achieved broad consensus, and is based on old fears of Castroism in the hemisphere. Rather than look afresh at the alignment and program of political forces inside Nicaragua, the State Department, too, attempts to "strengthen the middle ground" in the existing polarized situation.

Somoza Government officials have been drumming up the Red scare in Washington for some time. Luis Pallais Debayle, editor of the Government mouth-

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piece *Novedades*, vice president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Somoza's first cousin, declared before the National Press Club on May 31: "If Communist forces come to power in Nicaragua . . . the rest of Central America will fall in a matter of days. This will be very dangerous for the United States." Such rhetoric, moreover, does not fall on entirely deaf official ears. Last September, in the midst of the heaviest fighting, seventy-eight members of Congress petitioned Carter to do his "utmost to demonstrate the support of the United States Government for the Government of Nicaragua," because "irrefutable evidence amply documents the fact that the campaign of violence, urban terrorism and near civil war in Nicaragua is being carried out by a revolutionary group whose leaders have been trained in Havana and Moscow and whose goal is to make Nicaragua the new Cuba of the Western Hemisphere." Indeed, two of Somoza's closest friends in Congress, Representatives Charles Wilson (D., Texas) and John Murphy (D., N.Y.), have held key legislation—the foreign aid bill and the Panama Canal implementing legislation—hostage pending a favorable Administration policy toward the Nicaraguan dictator.

Whatever the truth of right-wing Congressional cries of alarm, they have served to excuse the Carter Administration from taking stronger action against Somoza. But now the State Department is edging toward the far-right view. Key officials in State view the Sandinist leadership as "for the most part, Marxist-Leninist," and dismiss the the Sandinist promises of open elections and democratic rule on grounds that you can't trust the Commies.

Most troublesome for policy makers, however, is the specter of Cuban aid—technical or military—to a popular Nicaraguan Government. Under the 1970s doctrine of anti-Communism, radical movements are no longer seen as directed by Cuba or the Soviet Union but rather subject to their exploitation. And the prospect of a Nicaraguan popular victory exporting its example to neighboring repressive republics is one that sends shivers down the backs of most Administration officials.

Yet already, right-wing outcries, especially in Congress, about Cuba's training and equipping of the guerrillas have heated up the latest round in the policy debate. Despite the lack of evidence, charges of Cuban involvement serve to feed an already existing hysteria, embraced by Carter and his top national security aides, over Cuban foreign policy, especially in Africa. Last May, in fact, President Carter placed the 82nd Airborne on alert as he accused the Cubans of sponsoring a Katangese rebellion in Zaire, thus pushing the United States closer to intervening in a Third World conflict than any other time since the Vietnam War.

Before the issue of Cuban involvement in the Nicaraguan struggle gains further credence, it would behoove policy makers to look at who has intervened most recently in the Nicaraguan crisis. For although Carter has not sent in troops so far, his sponsorship of an international mediation last fall constituted a distinct form of intervention in Nicaraguan political affairs. The U.S. negotiators arrived in Managua with both a precise set of objectives—involving the transfer of power to a moderate group—and a strategy for carrying them out—negotiations toward an internationally sponsored plebiscite. The mediation failed as Somoza refused to budge until 1981, leaving U.S. policy in disarray, and Nicaraguans subject to ever-increasing repression by the National Guard.

The U.S. search for alternatives to Somoza, moreover, has not extended very far beyond a narrow circle of business interests represented in the Broad Opposition Front (F.A.O.), despite the emergence of two broad-based popular groupings, the Movement for Popular Unity and the National Patriotic Front. When F.A.O. leaders Alfonso Robelo and Rafael Cordova Rivas were arrested on May Day, the State Department broke its long silence on Nicaragua and condemned "arbitrary arrests by the National Guard," but remained silent when more than a score of labor leaders in the National Patriotic Front were detained in June.

Keeping the guerrillas on the run has also absorbed U.S. attention. Long-suspected private pressure on the Governments of Costa Rica and Venezuela to stop aiding the Sandinists became a matter of public record in early March. At that time, the State Department endorsed a Venezuelan transfer of U.S. M-14 rifles to Costa Rica for use in "Operation Checkmate," a border-patrol maneuver aimed primarily at chasing the guerrillas off the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan frontier.

And over such critical issues as Somoza's financial solvency, the United States came down firmly on Somoza's side. After opposing last fall a $20 million loan from the International Monetary Fund, the United States threw its full 20 percent voting strength behind a $65 million loan in May. The loan went through.

A rigid U.S. commitment to the status quo in Nicaragua may prove the most dangerous course in this new period of heightened tension. The allegations of foreign intervention now emanate from all sides—from the Somoza Government's claims that Cuban airliners loaded with soldiers and arms have landed in Panama, to Costa Rican broadcasts alleging that U.S. naval vessels are firing on Sandinist positions. In the furor in Washington, however, the voice of the right is loudest. And Carter, hit with the "loss of Iran" and the "growing Soviet menace" may consider "losing Nicaragua" too costly a charge in an upcoming election year.

But the moment is also ripe for fresh departures on the part of the Carter Administration from a woeful history of interference in Nicaraguan affairs. By staying out, Carter could resuscitate his now tarnished human rights policy and give Nicaraguans the rightful chance to direct their own future. □

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# BOOKS & THE ARTS.

## His Own Best Hero

ANTHONY LUKAS

E MAN'S VOICE. *By Charles Mor- , Jr. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 322 $10.*

Last January, Sears, Roebuck & Company filed suit against ten Federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of al employment opportunity laws. behalf of all retailers employing re than fifteen persons, the world's gest retailer argued that such laws 're so confused and contradictory it s impossible for companies to com- . It asked the court to prohibit the 'ernment from taking action against rs for alleged discrimination against nen or blacks.

'he suit was an unusually bold stroke the generally cautious management ı major American corporation. The ıal Employment Opportunity Com- sion had long been investigating rs and was believed to be on the ge of filing a mammoth discrimina- ı suit against the company. Instead vaiting for the Government to move t, Sears launched a pre-emptive at- k. And it accompanied its legal ac- ı with a carefully conceived public ations blitz. News of the suit was ked first to business reporters, be- e those who normally cover the civil hts beat could get to it. And on the ' the suit was filed, the company held ress conference at the Sears Tower Chicago, seeking to portray itself not an opponent of equal employment ' se but as the leader of a corporate sade against bumbling governmen- regulation.

'he whole operation bore the imprint a master. Indeed, the suit drew an ra dollop of publicity because it had n conceived and executed and pub- ized by none other than Charles Mor- n Jr., perhaps the most vigorous and le white lawyer in the Southern civil hts movement of the 1960s.

'he irony, of course, was not lost on daily press: fiery civil rights leader 1960s changes sides, files suit to deny cks and women remedy for viola- tions of their rights. Magazine writers, digging further, had fun with other contrasts between the old Chuck Morgan and the new. Roaming the South in the 1960s for the American Civil Liberties Union, Morgan had little more than the shirt on his back and an overflowing briefcase. When he resigned in 1976 as director of the A.C.L.U.'s Washington office, he said he was quitting on a matter of principle, even though he had "no plans, no private law practice, no prospective high-paying clients which make lawyers attractive to law firms, no private wealth, not much savings, lots of expenses and a son in college." Now he has his own firm, Charles Morgan Jr. and Associates, with thirteen lawyers, some big corporate clients (among them the Tobacco Institute and the Grocery Manufacturers of America), and a lot of money pouring in (the bills on the Sears suit alone are said to have reached $300,000 by March 1).

To chide Morgan for betraying his own legacy would be a cheap shot. Affirmative action in the 1970s involves far more complex questions—witness the agonizing national debate over the *Bakke* case—than the moral imperatives of civil rights in the 1960s. Moreover, who among us has not shifted some of his perspective in the past decade?

Nevertheless, the dramatic change in Morgan's clientele may be relevant when reviewing this autobiographical survey of his legal career. For the book reeks of moral superiority, self-satisfaction and disdain for those who do not live up to Morgan's high standards of public service.

A personal disclaimer: I yield to no one in my admiration for Chuck Morgan's courage, conviction and resourcefulness. He was one of the true heroes of the civil rights movement. In 1964, he opened the A.C.L.U.'s Southern regional office in Atlanta and, largely through the force of his iconoclastic personality, dragged what was then a rather elitist organization into the battle to secure the rights of black people. Moreover, he has been a pathbreaker in the struggle to extend the traditional

*Anthony Lukas, formerly a* New rk Times *reporter, is the author of* ghtmare: The Underside of the Nix- Years *(The Viking Press).*

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conception of human rights to the broader social issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s. His defense of Capt. Howard Levy against charges of refusing to teach medicine to Special Forces troops, and later of Julian Bond, an outspoken critic of the war, against efforts to expel him from the Georgia House of Representatives, were landmark events, which helped give the nascent anti-war movement credibility and self-confidence. Later, as the A.C.L.U.'s man in Washington, he was a tenacious watchdog of Nixonian machinations and, ultimately, the most forceful advocate of the President's impeachment. For more than fifteen years, Chuck Morgan has given no quarter and taken no prisoners in the fight for human liberties.

But this book will do nothing to enhance his reputation. First, Morgan is no writer. His language is leaden, his organization pedestrian, his narrative style heavy-handed. But, more important, the book is relentlessly self-serving. Morgan comes off as a mean-spirited and vindictive man, less interested in breaking new ground than in settling old scores.

If there is an overarching theme, it is his assault on American liberalism, particularly Northern liberalism. Morgan is no political scientist, and one gets the feeling that he is not comfortable with abstraction, so it is perhaps not surprising that he never really tells us what he means by liberalism. It is probably safe to assume that he means the political movement which seeks to ameliorate human conditions, particularly for the disadvantaged, without—in the words of Robert Lekachman—"substantially altering the institutional arrangements or existing distributions of power and property." The notion that liberalism is excessively legalistic and fails to grapple with underlying economic issues, particularly the decisive question of class, is by now pretty much conventional wisdom in certain circles. There is nothing here which substantially advances the debate.

For Morgan seems less concerned with analyzing liberalism's failure than with dramatizing the difference between himself and his liberal adversaries. What emerges is a caricature, a comic-strip version of recent disputes within the American left: on the one hand, a coterie of cautious, inhibited, play-it-by-the-book liberals, principally based in New York and Washington, who are so bound by their "pragmatic" approach to moral questions that they consistently sacrifice the interests of the poor and disadvantaged and, on the other, the earthy, progressive Chuck Morgan who, because he has never lost touch with his working-class roots and the down-home wisdom of his Southern forebears, always fights the good fight for genuine democracy.

Thus, we have this on the warlike mood of Nixonian Washington:

> We all paid the high price of pragmatism; of hard decisions easily made; of fear of democracy. Antidemocratic militarism had captured our minds. It had spread slowly, undramatically. Adolf Hitler, defeated and dead, had provided us with the means to militarize the democracy. From Joseph Stalin had come the excuse.
>
> I had relearned that which, down deep, I always knew. It will be by small failures that democracy will die.

Or this on the impeachment battle:

> As young-to-middle-aged Nixon men spoke into our living rooms I heard from their liberal Washington counterparts the common refrain: "I'm for impeachment, but the people aren't."
>
> "Ain't you a people?" became my standard response.
>
> They "knew." Congress "knew." Washington's judges, reporters, editorial writers, commentators and lawyers "knew." So, as a way out, they refused to trust the people.

Or this on a meeting with liberal lobbyists on Capitol Hill:

> In the end the liberals decided not to push for an immediate vote. I looked around the room, shook my head, felt terribly sorry about these people, and left.

And so on, and so on, and so on.

One man who knows Morgan well has given me a plausible explanation for his *idée fixe*: "You have to remember that Chuck's political consciousness was born in Birmingham, Ala. [where he opened his first law office in 1958]. Birmingham in the early 1960s was probably the most polarized city in recent American history. You were either a Bull Connor man or a Martin Luther King man. There were no grays, no in-betweens—or at least that was the way the activists on both sides saw it. Yet, a lot of the Birmingham establishment, particularly the lawyers, tried to straddle the moral questions. A committed fighter like Chuck obviously found their equivocation unforgivable, and he has never forgotten it."

That analysis would also tend to explain some of the fierce battles Morgan later fought with his colleagues in the A.C.L.U. For if you are fighting the Ku Klux Klan or the White Councils, you expect perfidy from your enemies, but you demand absolute loyalty from your friends. If you don't get 100 percent support, particularly from the bureaucrats sitting safely in the home office, you feel utterly betrayed. That sense of betrayal is the consistent theme of the book's prolonged disparagement of the A.C.L.U. leadership.

The running fights which Morgan engaged in with the A.C.L.U.'s executives are too complex to review here in detail. And there is no agreement among those in the know about which side was more often in the right. Morgan tends to put much of the blame on Edward Ennis, the A.C.L.U.'s chairman at the time. He dismisses Ennis as "one more pragmatist from the Manhattan Stockade," suggests that he played an ignoble role in the Justice Department during World War II, and accuses him of repeatedly undercutting Morgan's most vigorous efforts on Watergate and impeachment.

One suspects a certain displacement of hostility. For Morgan's most effective antagonist during that period was the then-executive director, Aryeh Neier, a man capable of his own rigidities. Former colleagues say Morgan blamed Neier, more than anyone else, for letting him down in the crunch. Yet Neier is a more formidable opponent than Ennis, a skilled debater who could be counted on to fire back. In any case, Morgan lets Neier off here with a few relatively weak sallies.

The pity of it all is that a man with such energy, imagination and passion should be wasting his time at all blowing on the embers of old battles. There are plenty of new battles to be fought and, whatever side Chuck Morgan finds himself on in the future, he will be a worthy adversary. □

# Frisky Primers

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

MARX FOR BEGINNERS. *By Rius. Pantheon Books. 143 pp. Paper $2.95.*

LENIN FOR BEGINNERS. *By A & Z (Richard Appiganese and Oscar Zarate). Pantheon Books. 169 pp. Paper $2.95.*

THE ANTI-NUCLEAR HANDBOOK. *By Stephen Croall and Kaianders. Pantheon Books. 133 pp. Paper $2.95.*

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The top publishing dollar notoriously flows to the proprietors and promoters of guides to sexual ecstasy, spiritual exaltation, self-renewal by diet or running or sychological exercise or all three, and he scandalous secrets of famous figres. All the more honor accordingly to he few publishers who manage to surive according to older and more repectable criteria of taste, expression nd intellect. Pantheon has long been minent in this select company. Its curent list features such items as Herbert ans's *Deciding What's News*, a provoctive study of *Time*, *Newsweek*, CBS nd NBC interpretations of what is and hat is not fit to print or show; Edward aid's controversial *Orientalism*; John illett's stylish *Art & Politics in the eimar Period*, and Tamara K. Haeven and Randolph Langenbach's plendid evocation of a New England ill town in *Amoskeag*. Pantheon pubshes Studs Terkel's oral histories and eter Dickenson's Surrealistic thrillrs. As the examples imply, it has been ospitable to experiments in form and pic and undisdainful of potential best ellers.

The three items here considered are dult comic books, a promising new enture for Pantheon. Two of the three re unqualified successes. Rius, the om de plume of Eduardo del Rio, the ell-known Mexican editorial caricatuist, has pulled off the implausible trick f explaining the core of Marxist ought intelligibly and entertainingly. he three streams of thought which nverged in the Marxian view of uman history—French socialism, Gerian philosophy and English classical conomics—are far from simple. Neverheless Rius, without serious distortion, ucceeds in combining explanation with iography in an appealing bath of carons, wry wit, credible expressions of onfusion and frequent reviews of paricularly tricky concepts. An excellent lossary is a handy brief dictionary of ey terms. Alert teachers of the history f ideas could do worse than assign Rius o their apprentice scholars.

*Lenin for Beginners* is much less satsfactory. Perhaps because its authors ave pursued the Rius model too close-, the jokes seem forced, as though inerted according to formula. This is a omparatively minor blemish. Much ore damaging is a tendency to overwhelm potential readers with copious details of doctrinal history out of place in an introductory primer. The recondite intricacies of the 1903 Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party will surely flit into and out of the minds of all but the closest students of revolutionary history, many stages beyond that of the novice. Must one really care that Trotsky supported Martov and Plekhanov temporarily allied himself with Lenin over the definition of party membership in Paragraph 1 of the Party Rules? As this example, one of many, may suggest, A & Z commit the fatal pedagogical error of solemnity, delightfully avoided by Rius.

*Lenin for Beginners* suffers from another important defect. It is winner's history. Trotsky, Bukharin, Stalin and company are right when they agree with Lenin and wrong when they don't. It's as simple as that. The bias explains an exceedingly unsatisfactory two or three concluding pages. After quoting Lenin's unfavorable assessment of Stalin in his so-called "Last Testament" ("Stalin is too rude. . . ."), the authors breathtakingly assert that "Cold War hostility towards Russia and the errors of Stalinism have built up a false image of Lenin." Error is possibly not the best way of summarizing the Moscow trials, the cruelties of collectivization, the destruction of a revolutionary generation, the Nazi-Soviet pact, and the Gulag Archipelago. One cannot really have it both ways. Lenin simply cannot be credited with the glory of the October Revolution and simultaneously totally relieved of responsibility for its ghastly sequel. The continuing debate within the Communist parties of Western Europe over the viability of such central Leninist doctrines as the dictatorship of the proletariat attests to the possibility that even for Communists, error began earlier than Stalin.

If anything, *The Anti-Nuclear Handbook*, for which the Three Mile Island incident is a splendid commercial, succeeds even more completely than *Marx for Beginners*. Croall and Kaianders narrate a coherent tale of the origins and principles of nuclear fission, its application to weaponry, subsequent extensions to the generation of electricity, and the assorted hazards and snares entailed by preference for this technology over the "softer" alternatives supplied by sun, wind and water. Very concisely, the *Handbook* explains why nuclear energy has become so expensive, even before Harrisburg, that private investors are sheering away from new commitments. There is an elegant summary of the reasons why nuclear energy is vulnerable to accident and the assaults of terrorists motivated either by avarice or ideology. It speaks volumes about both American technology and politics that more than a third of a century after Hiroshima, nobody knows how to dispose of radioactive wastes endowed with half-lives which stretch over thousands of years.

No wonder that the battle against the atom is rapidly becoming this decade's movement substitute for the anti-war demonstrations of the 1960s. *The Anti-Nuclear Handbook* should become a useful organizing tool in the genuinely pro-life agitation of our time. If Freud is as well treated as Marx in Pantheon's next entry, the world's neurotics will have occasion for gratitude. □

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# Surviving Recent History

JULIUS LESTER

DEATH OF A REBEL: Starring Phil Ochs and a Small Circle of Friends. *By Marc Eliot. Doubleday/Anchor Books. 316 pp. $4.95.*

NEW AGE BLUES: On the Politics of Consciousness. *By Michael Rossman. E.P. Dutton. 288 pp. $6.95.*

I remember standing backstage at hootenannies during the mid-1960s, listening to Phil Ochs perform his "I Ain't A-Marching Anymore," which was the anthem of the anti-war, anti-draft movement. I envied Phil's ability to bring an audience to its feet, cheering and applauding. When it was my turn, I simply came onstage, and closing my eyes to better see the pain and aspirations of my slave foreparents whose vehicle I was, sang freedom songs and spirituals. Introverted folksingers don't become stars.

Phil Ochs was a star, one of those like Tom Paxton, Bob Dylan and Buffy St. Marie whose voices and songs expressed the protest and hope of the 1960s. Yet, in April 1976, when I heard

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that Phil, at age 36, had hung himself, I was saddened but not surprised. I remembered Phil walking offstage to thunderous applause and asking, "How was I? I was great, huh?" I remembered his ambition when he would say, "I'm going to be bigger than Dylan." And I remembered one of the last times I saw him before my own withdrawal from performing, standing in a quiet corner at a party saying, "I'm a star now, and there's nothing there."

Phil's songs and his concern helped make the 1960s a time of promise, but sometime between 1968 and 1972, most of us who'd helped to make the 1960s recognized that it was over. That drive to create change, that urgency to make the world fit for human habitation which had defined our lives, had disappeared from America, leaving us to find another way to live.

Many of us passed through despair before recognizing that learning who we were as human beings was also a political act.

Phil remained in hell, wandering through its rooms as if he had come home—drinking uncontrollably, sleeping in alleyways, beating women. The story of Marc Eliot's book is pathetic and painful, but the author does not help us understand why Phil lived and died as he did. One of the functions of biography is to help us know our own lives better through the examination of another's. Lacking that illumination, *Death of a Rebel* reads like a scenario for a mediocre television movie.

Michael Rossman survived the arduous journey from one decade to the next. A political activist since the Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1964, he was also one of the finest writers in the 1960s, and in this, his third book, establishes his importance for the present decade.

*New Age Blues* is a collection of sixteen essays, whose common thread is a discussion of the personal and political implications of the "growth/human potential/New Age movement." Unlike many commentators on the 1970s, Rossman does not assume that the current interest in personal development is indicative either of political apathy or of the kind of narcissism Christopher Lasch criticizes. His voice is refreshing because he writes as a political activist who in the 1970s has studied "Tai Chi, psychic healing, sex therapy" but does not have a political or psychological ideology to peddle. He is simply trying to see what is.

Rossman sees the human potential movement as a logical outgrowth of the 1960s and a complement to it:

> . . . the 1960s had prepared and in fair degree demanded a complementary mass questioning and re-exploration of private being and consciousness—for when the fabric of society is torn and reconfigured, so is that of the self, the two being so nearly one.

The transition from the 1960s to the 1970s was not, however, only one from social activism to personal consciousness. We also experienced an "erosion of confidence in the structures we have created to deal with reality." This loss of faith in government, the family structure and now the economy is being replaced by "a more desperate grasping for an authority which is clean and sure. If Nixon finds Christ as his Savior . . . I won't be surprised, for I'm sure that the disintegration of secular authority will lead many others to do so." Thus, the intense interest in gurus, spiritual masters, therapies and the occult is a logical consequence of the 1960s.

Rossman's primary objection to the Age of Gurus is that today's spiritual "masters" not only open one to "mysterious realms of experience" but also give a "prefabricated frame" in which one must understand the mystery. It is this "frame" Rossman sees as fraught with dangerous political consequences.

> Hasn't everyone had the intimation that our age is growing ripe for the advent of the Leader, someone of the charismatic stature of Hitler or Jesus, whose presence will catalyze all this gathering need in a surge of belief that will sweep through our culture and our lives, transforming them violently?

When a society can no longer create certainty for its members, the alternative is chaos. Rossman is, however, able to see that chaos is merely another face of the archetype of order.

> Confronted with chaos, cognitive dissonance, unresolved ambiguity, and tension, the primal impulse both within the self and in society is to close these out, simplify things, make secure our frames of understanding once again, by whatever means. Yet, if there is one prime educational need for us as citizens of our time, it is to learn how to endure chaos, to appreciate it, survive in it, build in and from it our structure of meaning anew, accepting their dissolution and re-creation as the process of life.

The book contains two essays of major importance. "A Phenomenon of the Seventies" is a devastating critique of Werner Erhard and est. The philosophy of est is that the individual is totally responsible for his/her reality, and it frightens Rossman, because "the proposition that you make your own rea ity," that you are "ultimately respo sible for everything that you expe ence" means then "by symmetry [tha you yourself are not responsible f anything that happens to or is exp rienced by anyone else." This is "a de heresy to the human spirit."

"On Some Matters of Concern in Ps chic Research" is as important to t 1970s as *Silent Spring* was to t 1950s. It is a startling, almost unbelie able exposition of what the Gover ments of the United States and Sovi Union are doing in the area of the c cult. Current scientific research is d covering that astral projection, ES dowsing, telepathy, and so forth have basis in scientific fact and can be co trolled for military purposes. Rossm contends that there now exists a ps chic technology and that the arms ra is being complemented by a race in ps chic research.

As early as 1960, the C.I.A. was tempting "to organize parapsycholo cal strike forces to mess with the min of Soviet leaders." By the early 197 "the Soviets were able to influence te pathically the behavior of people, al their emotions or health, and even k at long distance." In 1973, the C.I. employed two psychics in astral proj tion, who "accurately described the co tents of confidential files in sec domestic military bases," and gave d scriptions of hidden Soviet and Chin facilities, descriptions later confirm by agents in those countries.

Excerpting these sensational tidb does the essay a disservice, beca Rossman has done a serious piece of search which is convincingly do mented. It is my hope that you will re the essay.

*New Age Blues* is too rich with ide to summarize simply, or describe ad quately. The quality of Rossman's wr ing equals the quality of his intell and humanity. He invites us to sha what he has to offer, without imposi his conclusions. He does not argue advocate. He reflects, but with a qu and compelling passion. I finished t book feeling that I had just spent s eral hours with a very good man.

INTERVENTION Issue is availabl from *The Nation* at bulk rates—1 copies, $8; 50 copies, $30; 100 copie $50; 1,000 copies, $300.

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*Historian Theodore Roszak recommends—*

# "A grand and thoroughly enjoyable book: a true political education...

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


George Hines



He has been described as "the conscience of American journalism." His quarter-century with *The Nation* included the years when America needed a conscience most—the years of Cold War and Korea, McCarthy, Vietnam and Watergate. His books—among them *Factories in the Field, Ill Fares the Land, Brothers Under the Skin,* and *Prejudice*—helped create social change rather than simply reflect it. As Nicholas von Hoffman says, "Carey McWilliams doesn't cash in on trends, he makes them."

His continuing efforts in behalf of California migrant workers, interned Japanese-Americans in the '40s, victims of witch-hunts, blacklists, anti-Semitism, and racial prejudice vividly demonstrate his uncompromising dedication to truth and justice.

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By his own reckoning, writes McWilliams, he has "known five 'worlds': the one I grew up in as a boy on a cattle ranch in northwestern Colorado; the world of the 1920s which I explored as an 'expatriate' in Los Angeles; the surging world of the 1930s [in California]; the exciting 'world' of the war years with the promise of a postwar 'peace' that never came; and the thirty-year phase of the Cold War that coincided with my years at *The Nation.*"

In his book, McWilliams explores each of these worlds in rich detail: Upton Sinclair and the EPIC campaign in California that helped change American politics • the opportunity, as editor of *The Nation,* to nourish such "new, irreverent talents" as Robert Sherrill, Dan Wakefield, Jessica Mitford, Nelson Algren, Terry Southern and Kenneth Rexroth • journalistic scoops, including *The Nation's* advance word of the Cuban invasion • Nixon's "Seventh Crisis"—and the real, unspoken scandal of Watergate • the creation of "special-issue journalism"—which became today's investigative reporting • and much, much more.

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# Women's News

KATE ELDRED

THE POSSIBLE SHE. *By Susan Jacoby. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 189 pp. $8.95.*

Susan Jacoby describes her distress at being offered a job reporting on "women's news" when she was fresh out of college; distress because she was determined to be taken seriously and everyone knew that the women's page was boring and trivial. She got another job, learned her trade, and then time and events brought her and "women's news" back together.

This collection of columns and essays exemplify both Jacoby's recent career and the preoccupations of contemporary women. Some of them are amusing, some downright funny; more of them are thoughtful, moderate elucidations of events and issues that particularly affect women of the twentieth century.

Like money. No matter what her class or income level, it is likely that a woman will outlive the man who has supported her. Jacoby pragmatically explains how women must take charge of their fiscal futures, how they have been complicit in their lack of access to financial information. In a controversial column, she suggests that when women begin to reach parity with men, reaching the acme of their power and income after middle age as men do, their value as potential mates need not decline with their beauty.

Historically, for good or ill, women have lived their lives within families, and family concerns have generally occupied them for more years than their male counterparts. Jacoby takes on the "child-free life stylers" in a blistering reminder that all of society is responsible for the rearing of the young. She also visits several families in which aging relatives are being cared for and lets the members of the families speak for themselves about the effects of this responsibility. There is also a sentimental letter to her grandmother who instilled some strong traditional values in the writer—values that, though transformed, continue to inspire her.

Whether they have been aware of it or not, women's lives have been profoundly influenced by political decisions and actions of the last decade. Jacoby offers a personal view of the Supreme Court abortion ruling by relating her own ambiguity about access to birth control and the penalty such limits place on the young and the poor. A self-confessed "First Amendment junkie," she deplores the feminist anti-pornography stance, and says that an "unwritten law" that exonerated two celebrated women who attacked their male abusers isn't good enough. In a wonderfully crabby essay she reminds today's heedless youth of how heavily indebted they are to the historic changes of the 1960s.

The decaying but still formidable dual standard for men and women comes in for its share of comment: when she takes on the wardrobe engineers, she is bemused to find that they feel it necessary to tell professional women not to wear disco garb to the office, and in a thoughtful essay on two Russian poets, she touches on the debate about whether or not there are separate gender-defined literary sensibilities. She decides that there are, but that either one can validly express universal feelings.

Indeed they can, since the entire human race is tidily divided into one or the other sex, but the list of topics addressed here demonstrates that there is still a segregation of concerns. She is the quintessential feminist, sturdy and sympathetic. She can soothe and edify in the same paragraph; without apology, condescension or uncontrolled outrage, she addresses precisely those topics which are of interest to women. She's her own best advertisement for "women's news," and I suspect that no one is more surprised than she at the turn her career has taken since that first unhappy interview. □

*Kate Eldred is a former newspaper editor and freelance critic who lives on Cape Cod, Mass.*

# DANCE

NANCY GOLDNER

Animal life has long been a fascination of choreographers. In traditional ballet, animal imitations serve the libretto—a woman impersonates a bird to portray the elusive muse. Besides being a workable metaphor, animal imagery is often a device by which the choreographer introduces spiritual values into the libretto. Among modern choreographers, Merce Cunningham and Paul Taylor have shown keen interest in animal movement. To Taylor, animals are beasts, and when humans imitate them they are bestial. Much of Taylor's perverse humor stems from the irony of dancers twisting their "natural" grac into "unnatural" ungainliness. Cun ningham, like ballet librettists, tends t idealize animals, but instead of usin them as metaphors, he uses them as standard by which dancers may meas ure their technical finesse. The ani mal's precision of movement, economy o means, sensitivity to touch as the foo treads the ground, and the seemin ability of animals to know what's goin on without looking are qualities whic the Cunningham dancer tries to get hi muscles and mind to approximate. Th better the dancer, the more anima imagery he evokes.

Not until the Age of Aquarius di some choreographers begin to see i animal life a moral imperative fo human behavior. Animals live in ec logical systems; people should behav communally. Animals do not justif their existence, nor need dancers ju tify their dances. Animals live in a stat of grace—of unfettered movement, i harmony with the environment, an above notions of the beautiful and ugl So might dancers, if they could just di pense with old-fashioned aesthetic sy tems, and other hang-ups.

This is where psychology comes i particularly group or communal the apy. Ann Halprin has been a pioneer i communal workshops for dancers i San Francisco (naturally). Just recen ly, one of her protégés, Simone Fort moved the redwood forests to Merc Cunningham's quintessential New Yor studio at Westbeth. Forti's progran described as a "nature fantasy," was er titled *Estuary*. The cross-currents water were conveyed by a stunnin sculpture, by Harriet Feigenbaum, two rows of tree branches nailed t gether in concentric patterns, throug which the dancers could crawl. The took great advantage of the set; *Estu ary* was primarily a dissertation o crawling, or on the desirability of bein as free as animals.

To Forti, freedom for the dance means returning to all fours, gettin

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| of | | **EMPLOYMENT** |
| ***Inflation*** | | *An End To The* |
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| **MASS** | | *Duopoly-Governed* |
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| of | | *Economic* |
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| **Welfarism** | | **'Demo-Repugnant Welfarism'** |
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closer to the earth. Forti dancers specialize in touching the floor with anything but their feet. A typical Forti body balances on the side of the head, the thigh and palm. In such poses the body's outline is often startling and as beautifully intricate as a nautilus shell. Yet because of the tranquillity of the dancers' demeanor and the length of time they remained in one position, their poses had more atmospheric than imagistic force. I imagine that Forti's inspiration for *Estuary* might have been cows at pasture. Forti translates their lackadaisical behavior into a live-and-let-live philosophy. What Flaubert understood as stupidity, Forti understands as meditation. She translates the herding instinct of grazing animals into a spontaneous gesture of affinity. Most parts of *Estuary* were designed to show the group divided into individual and communal activity in order to demonstrate the ethos of laissez-faire. While one dancer was crawling or waving fans about or simply breathing, the others would nestle together, scatter and regroup—signs of unspoken intimacy.

The child is always implicitly present in groups such as Forti's. There was a real child in *Estuary*, a girl of about 8. To me, the only lovely aspect about *Estuary* other than its set was the way this girl freely and unself-consciously undermined all the clichés about freedom and innocence. While the grown-ups meditated beatifically after their migrations, the girl (quietly) poked at her nose and twiddled her big toe. While the grown-ups crawled with a degree of daring and grace, the girl rolled around with hesitation and lack of imagination. If a real animal had also been present, staring stupidly at the scene, the irony would have been complete. Nevertheless, it was still obvious that the last episode of *Estuary*, in which the girl was allowed to climb across the backs of her friends, was her reward for being a good Joe.

I went to see *Estuary* because a few weeks earlier I had seen Forti do a short solo as part of a long benefit program. The solo, which also took place mainly on the floor, was a brilliant demonstration of how changes of weight and attack alter the body's emotional resonances. Merely by throwing or sidling herself into somersaults of extraordinary variety, Forti accumulated what seemed an exhaustive lexicon of human feeling. She definitely was not an animal, and if she didn't seem quite human either it was because she was being a virtuoso. *Estuary* is a prime example of what happens when virtuosity is sacrificed for philosophy.

# INDIGENOUS MUSIC

## NAT HENTOFF

The most truly indigenous American music is, of course, that of the American Indian. And it is a music about which most other Americans are wholly ignorant except for memories of insistently menacing drums and spiraling war cries in old movies for which ethnomusicologists did not serve as consultants. Indeed, most of the time, the Indians on screen were not even Indian. And so, if there is any general sense of the nature of Indian music among non-Native Americans, it is of an exceedingly narrow range of melodic and rhythmic structures that, absent the United States Cavalry, are quite repetitive and boring.

Insofar as a single album can dispel this thorough misconception, *A Cry From the Earth: Music of the North American Indians* (Folkways) is absorbingly instructive. Compiled from various private and institutional collections by John Bierhorst, the first side of the set explores tribal musical styles, region by region. And the second half focuses even more specifically on the relationships between Indian music and Indian culture. While there are a thetic pleasures for those who sust these traditions, the music is essentia functional. As Bierhorst notes: "So are used to make children sleep, to v a lover, to mourn the dead, to g power over game animals, or to br victory in war." Music is not a th apart—to be appreciated or analyzed consumed for fun. It is inextrica connected with just about every p poseful activity in Indian life.

The flute, for instance, one of the Indian instruments that can carr melody, was played almost exclusiv by men, particularly young men. its purpose was to ensorcell yo women. One such flute recording h is by a Yuchi player who himself used flute music to captivate a wom He explains the instrument's power coming from the unbearable "feelin loneliness" produced by the flute, "c ing the woman to be drawn irresistil to the player. And after making particular recording (in 1900 on a cylinder now transferred to tape quite audible), the Indian became sad because the music had made feel very lonesome.

There is also a recording by a C pewa woman who sings a love song was traditionally performed by women of her village as the warr left for battle. The women would company them a short distance, then turn back to the village sing

### NIGHTFALL

What sustains it,
The half-open
Clarity of nightfall,
The light let loose in the gardens?

All the branches,
Conquered by the weight of birds,
Lean toward the darkness.

Pure, self-absorbed moments
Still gleam
On the fences.

Receiving night,
The groves become
Hushed fountains.

A bird falls,
The grass grows dark,
Edges blur, lime is black,
The world is less credible.

Octavio Paz

*(Translated from the Spanish by Eliot Weinberger)*

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this song and imitating the flutes of their lovers. ("Now it is time for you to go on a long journey.")

One of the most exciting tracks (recorded around 1963), a Kiowa Gourd Dance, marks the end of the journey as the warriors plunge into the heart of battle. The music savors in memory those nineteenth-century confrontations during which the Kiowa would compete with one another for the honor of capturing a live bugler from the United States Cavalry. As Bierhorst points out, "if the bugler refused to play at the . . . victory dance, he would be killed. If he played well, he might be released unharmed." This performance, with chanting voices, fiercely polyrhythmic drums, and the sounds of the captured Army bugler, makes historical visions vivid indeed.

Other Indian visions and memories are revealed in the "Ghost Dances"—that mass levitation of the spirit in the late nineteenth century by which the dancers believed they could bring back the dead and thereby have enough numbers finally to eliminate the white hordes. (One of these dances was recorded in 1894, and through engineering diligence, the sounds are alive again.)

There is much more in this illumination of the scope of Indian music: a Navajo night chant in which the male singers, in falsetto, impersonate gods and goddesses; a Hopi "Sleep Song" in which the rhythms change suddenly and complexly, much like present advanced jazz; antiphonal Eastern Woodlands singing over buoyant, syncopated rhythms, and a cheerful Cherokee lullaby, brought back by hunters who, it was said, heard mother bears gentling their cubs to sleep with this very melody.

In many tribes, certain songs were regarded as the personal property of those who created them—and only they could sing them. In 1909, a member of the Nez Percé tribe recorded such a song in Idaho, "Power Song of the Eagle," in which he invoked the force and skill of that fearsome creature to make him a more accomplished hunter.

John Bierhorst has also written a book, *A Cry From the Earth* (Four Winds Press) in which he transcribes many of the songs and places them in historical and musicological context. (There are also clarifying photographs.) Written for young adults, it can be read with pleasure and profit by all of us grown-ups who are new to Indian music. More so, indeed, than specialized ethnomusicological volumes on the subject. □

# Crossword Puzzle No. 1779

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 How the raisins are passed? That's about right! (5)
4 Not the type hit by battledores—they put them in rings. (9)
9 Brave examples of small state birds. (7)
10 Decisions handed down sometimes on tablets? (7)
11 12 and 13 A dilemma on the stage, but it might be no better to boo. (2,2,2,3,2,2)
16 Such an act is bad—very bad. . . (7)
17 . . .and typical of this place. (7)
19 Is the listener commonly worn out at this distance? (7)
22 Made by the late, great sports figure. (7)
24 25 and 26 Does one in desperation, being pursued by the police? (Fall here, perhaps, when you first do it.) (4,2,3,4)
29 Take about one high card in the shuffle—it might be given out in a late afternoon deal. (7)
30 He has lots of ups and downs, but they should come out even. (7)
31 How to make steam? (Consumers on board, possibly.) (9)
32 Runs swiftly back with the fiddle? (5)

DOWN

1 Sat up in death—needing a little drink? (9)
2 Live somewhere, ready to ride? (7)
3 14 and 27 Where they might keep ducks, if there is? (4,2,3,4)
4 Pertaining to the stomach, what might cause discomfort sounds like a stratagem. (7)
5 This famous name is obviously Ror ic. (7)
6 15 and 28 It doesn't go on to say "d (quack) or "goose" (honk) so the must be complete in itself. (4,2,3,4
7 Study what travelers go on, in out (7)
8 Evidently the singer only knew this (5)
14 See 3 down
15 See 6 down
18 Most operas have such formal posals. (9)
20 Once more goes over a couple of n and notices. (7)
21 What happens when a guy stays ou the sun is touching. (7)
22 As they used to say, depth bombs re to be put there. (3,4)
23 Might one bounce? (7)
24 It might be an animal as a sign of family. (5)
27 See 3 down
28 See 6 down

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1778
ACROSS: 1 Fast friends; 9 Baroness; Thebes; 11 All told; 12 Peasant; 14 Starve Overeats; 17 Shamrock; 20 Proust; 24 A cias; 26 Tutors; 27 Drops off; 28 Whi sours. DOWN: 2 and 3 A bolt from the b 4 Rose; 5 and 22 Extreme unction; 6 Deed and 25 Call it a day; 8 Peanut; 13 Works Exorcisor; 18 Hang up; 19 Oboists; Piccolo; 21 Staffs; 23 Tooth.

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


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